ABRAHAM JOHANNES HENNING v THE GENERAL DENTAL COUNCIL

An appeal under section 29 of the Dentists Act 1984 is a rehearing requiring a more intensive process than ordinary review, but the appellate court remains slow to interfere with primary factual findings. Intervention is justified where findings are plainly wrong or so out of tune with the evidence as to be unreasonable.

A professional disciplinary tribunal need not make a general assessment of a witness’s credibility or address every evidential issue. It must give sufficient reasons to show why the decision was reached. On impairment and sanction, appropriate weight must be given to the tribunal’s professional expertise. Retirement does not prevent assessment of current fitness to practise, and conditions need only be imposed where they are practical and workable.

The appellant, an orthodontist who had retired from clinical practice but remained registered, appealed under section 29 of the Dentists Act 1984 against a Professional Conduct Committee decision. The Committee found misconduct proved in relation to the treatment and care of one patient, determined that his fitness to practise was impaired, and imposed six months’ suspension followed by review.

The appeal challenged factual findings concerning the patient’s credibility, the finding of current impairment, and the proportionality and workability of the sanction. The central issues were the approach required on a rehearing, the adequacy of the Committee’s reasons, the significance of remediation and retirement, and whether suspension was an appropriate response.

1. Appeal dismissed. The appeal under section 29 of the Dentists Act 1984 was by way of rehearing under PD52D paragraph 19. A rehearing involved a more intensive process than review, but there was little or no relevant distinction in the degree of deference owed to primary factual findings. The appellant had to show that the Committee’s decision was wrong or unjust because of serious procedural irregularity.
2. The applicable threshold for interfering with primary findings was that the finding was plainly wrong or so out of tune with the evidence properly read as to be unreasonable. The Committee was entitled to resolve the disputed allegations by reference to the evidence, the clinical records and the evidence it had heard directly. It was not required to transfer credibility concerns arising on one issue to every other allegation, or to make a general comparative credibility assessment at the outset.
3. The Committee’s reasons were adequate. Read as a whole, together with the parties’ submissions and the underlying evidence, the determination showed why the Committee preferred the patient’s account and relied on the absence of relevant clinical records. The identity of a staff member and the alleged deliberate infliction of pain were not critical to the findings under challenge.
4. Following Clarke, the Committee was required to assess current fitness to practise notwithstanding retirement, because the appellant remained on the Dentists’ Register and could return to practice. The Committee had considered the appellant’s insight, remediation and otherwise lengthy career, but was entitled to conclude that the evidence did not establish that learning had been embedded in clinical practice.
5. The Committee was entitled to reject conditional registration as not yet practical or workable. Retirement could make the necessary supervision, support and auditing arrangements difficult, but did not make suspension impermissible. A period of suspension with review could allow the appellant to identify a potential placement and colleagues, after which workable conditions might be considered. The sanction was appropriate and necessary in the public interest and was not excessive or disproportionate.

The judgment states that the appeal was brought under section 29 of the Dentists Act 1984 from the Professional Conduct Committee of the General Dental Council. The Committee had imposed six months’ suspension with review. The High Court dismissed the appeal.