RONALD PHILPOT (R on the application of) v COMMISSIONER OF POLICE

A power to suspend or redeploy a police officer under regulation 11 of the Police (Conduct) Regulations 2020 does not authorise restrictions on the officer’s private life. Regulation 6(2) of the Police Regulations 2003, read with the Commissioner’s statutory responsibility for direction and control under section 4(3) of the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011, may nevertheless authorise an individual restriction designed to secure the proper exercise of a constable’s functions. That includes compliance with professional standards and avoidance of interference with misconduct proceedings. Such a restriction must comply with Article 8 and be proportionate. An error in the legal basis will not necessarily result in practical relief where it is highly likely that the outcome would have been substantially the same.

The claimant, a serving Metropolitan Police officer, sought judicial review of a restriction imposed during an ongoing misconduct investigation concerning allegations of domestic abuse involving his wife and children. The restriction prohibited direct or indirect contact with his wife, subject to family-court requirements and childcare arrangements made through a third party.

The claimant challenged the legal basis for the restriction, relying on regulation 11 of the Police (Conduct) Regulations 2020, regulation 6 of the Police Regulations 2003, section 4(3) of the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011, and Article 8 ECHR. The central questions were whether the restriction was authorised by law and whether it was proportionate.

1. Grounds 1 and 4 succeeded. Regulation 11 of the Police (Conduct) Regulations 2020 concerns suspension and consideration of temporary redeployment as an alternative. It does not confer a power to restrict an officer’s private life or contact with a witness. The original decision and later reviews purported to exercise that power, producing a material error of law.
2. Regulation 6(1) of the Police Regulations 2003 gives effect to the permanent restrictions in Schedule 1 but does not itself confer power to impose additional restrictions. Regulation 6(2) permits three categories of further private-life restriction: restrictions designed to secure the proper exercise of a constable’s functions; restrictions temporarily necessary under sub-paragraph (a); and restrictions approved by the Secretary of State under sub-paragraph (b).
3. The first category may apply to an individual officer. A restriction designed to ensure compliance with the Standards of Professional Behaviour, including acting with integrity and avoiding conduct that discredits the police service or undermines public confidence, may secure the proper exercise of constable functions. The disciplinary investigation and proceedings themselves form part of police functions, so preventing interference with the complainant and main witness could fall within the power.
4. Section 4(3) of the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011, concerning direction and control of the Metropolitan Police Service, was to be read with regulation 6(2). This construction did not offend the principle of legality because Article 8 is a qualified right and regulation 6 supplied the necessary specific authority.
5. The restriction engaged Article 8 and the decisions were not initially in accordance with law. Nevertheless, the restriction pursued prevention of disorder or crime and protection of the rights and freedoms of others. It was proportionate because the wife was the complainant and potential witness, alternative remedies were not preventative, and childcare contact remained possible through a third party.
6. Relief was refused under section 31(2A) of the Senior Courts Act 1981, since it was highly likely that the outcome would not have been substantially different had the legal error not occurred. The judicial review claim was therefore allowed on Grounds 1 and 4, but no relief was granted.

First-instance judicial review in the High Court (Administrative Court). The claim was allowed on Grounds 1 and 4, but relief was refused under section 31(2A) of the Senior Courts Act 1981.