SARAH BECKER (R on the application of) v PLYMOUTH CITY COUNCIL

[2022] EWHC 1885 (Admin)

Case details

Case citations
[2022] EWHC 1885 (Admin)
Court
High Court (Administrative Court)
Judgment date
20 July 2022
Judgment text

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Subjects
Administrative law Public law Judicial review — statutory guidance and rationality
Keywords
special guardianship financial support means testing statutory guidance local authority financial support rationality dependent children additional needs Children Act 1989
Outcome
claim succeeded; decision quashed and remitted for a fresh decision
Judicial consideration

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Summary

A local authority must comply with the statutory framework governing special guardianship financial support. It must have regard to the statutory guidance and give cogent reasons for departing from it. A non-statutory means-test model may be adapted, but the authority must preserve its coherence and rationally account for relevant household circumstances. Where a model adopts income-support allowance rates to represent ordinary family expenditure, a local authority cannot replace that approach with a percentage disregard that omits dependent children from the calculation. A separate assessment may be required for additional expenditure arising from a child’s illness, disability, emotional or behavioural difficulties, or past abuse or neglect.

Factual background

The claimant was the special guardian of two children and received financial support from the defendant local authority. Following changes in her benefits, the authority reassessed the award using its working practice for adoption and special guardianship financial support.

The claimant sought judicial review on four grounds. She challenged the decision to means-test her while receiving Income Support, the treatment of household expenditure, the failure to include an element for the children’s additional needs, and the alleged irrationality of an allowance said to threaten the stability of the arrangements. The central issues were whether the working practice was lawful and whether the reassessment had been carried out rationally.

Held

  1. Statutory hierarchy. Sections 14A to 14F of the Children Act 1989, the Special Guardianship Regulations 2005, and the statutory guidance formed successive levels of legal obligation. The guidance did not have the force of primary or secondary legislation, but the authority had to have regard to it and could depart from it only for cogent reasons.
  2. Means-testing. Ground 1 failed. The recommendation that a person receiving Income Support should receive the maximum payment did not make the model irrational merely because the period of Income Support alone might be short. The recommendation was distinct from the normative means-testing provisions. Regulation 13 required relevant benefits and financial resources to be taken into account, and means-testing was the default approach contemplated by the statutory guidance.
  3. Household expenditure. Ground 2 succeeded. The Department’s model used Income Support allowance rates, increased by 25 per cent, and thereby accounted for dependent children as well as the special guardian and any partner. The defendant’s working practice instead disregarded 25 per cent of household income and included only a personal allowance for the carer. That was a fundamental departure which omitted the claimant’s dependent children and produced a material financial disadvantage. Having chosen to means-test by reference to the model, the authority could not destroy its coherence without justification.
  4. Additional needs. Ground 3 failed. Regulation 6(2)(b) provided a possible route to support where a child required special care involving greater expenditure because of specified conditions. The means-test model was concerned with when and how to means-test, not with incorporating every additional-needs payment into the calculation. The claimant and authority could resume the ordinary process of requesting and assessing additional assistance.
  5. The court did not determine the challenge to the 100 per cent taper or Ground 4. The decision of 10 September 2021 was quashed, and a fresh decision had to be made in light of the judgment.

The court’s approach to earlier authorities

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Appellate history

This was a first-instance judicial review in the Administrative Court. The challenged decision was quashed and the matter required reconsideration by Plymouth City Council.

Key cases cited

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Cases citing this case

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