THOMAS HODSON & Anor v PERSON UNKNOWN A & Ors

For a civil claim under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, the claimant must prove on the balance of probabilities both the course of conduct and the defendant’s responsibility for it. The court may draw an inference from circumstantial evidence, but inference must be distinguished from speculation. The seriousness of the allegation remains relevant to the assessment of probabilities and the strength of evidence required. Harassment is a matter of fact and degree, falling between irritating conduct and persistent, deliberate, unreasonable and oppressive conduct targeted at another person. Where harassment is proved, a permanent injunction may be granted if repetition remains a real risk, with damages assessed for distress and injury to feelings and reasonable consequential expenditure.

The claimants brought proceedings under section 3 of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 against two identified defendants and two persons unknown. They alleged that threatening telephone calls and voicemail messages demanding payment of money had been made by persons acting at the instance of the identified defendants.

The underlying dispute concerned building sub-contracts and sums allegedly withheld. The principal issue was whether the calls had been made and whether the identified defendants were responsible for them. The court also determined the appropriate injunction and damages.

1. Liability. The claimants proved on the balance of probabilities that the calls and voicemail messages had been made, that TH had been genuinely distressed, and that DD and LD were behind them. The evidence established a binary choice between genuine harassment and fabrication; it did not shift the burden of proof to the defendants. The court nevertheless treated the binary analysis as an aid to evaluating the evidence rather than as a legal presumption.
2. The court applied the principles under sections 1 and 3 of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997. If TH’s evidence was true, the communications constituted harassment. The description in Hayes v Willoughby was adopted as the relevant general characterisation, while the distinction between irritating conduct and unreasonable and oppressive conduct remained a matter of fact and degree. The civil standard of proof applied, subject to the principle that serious allegations require cogent evidence proportionate to their inherent improbability.
3. The responsibility of DD and LD could be inferred from the sequence of events, their knowledge of confidential solicitor’s communications, the content of the threats, their unsatisfactory evidence and the cessation of the harassment after personal service of the interim injunction. The court rejected the submission that the irrational or crass nature of the conduct made responsibility inherently implausible.
4. Remedies. A permanent injunction was justified because there remained a risk of repetition without legal protection. TH was awarded £11,500 for distress and injury to feelings. He could not recover damages for distress suffered by family members. Security costs were recoverable while reasonably required, but only until 23:59 on 27 May 2021, approximately one month after the injunction.