CHRISTDEENA ELLIS v DAVID BURRIN

A claim may be struck out under Civil Procedure Rules 1998 rule 3.4 where it discloses no reasonable grounds, is incoherent, vexatious or abusive, or fails to comply with pleading requirements. A claim which in substance seeks to relitigate earlier proceedings is an abuse of process. A solicitor’s preparation of a draft order for approval by the court, without more, does not establish fraud or found a cause of action. Any tort claim arising from long-known events is subject to the applicable limitation period.

The claimant brought a claim against a solicitor who had acted for the opposing party in earlier county court proceedings concerning ownership of a property. She alleged fraud, improper conduct and wrongful enforcement of orders made in 2008 and 2009. The defendant applied to strike out the claim under Civil Procedure Rules 1998 rule 3.4, alternatively seeking summary judgment under Part 24. The claimant applied to strike out the defendant’s application. The central issues were whether the claim disclosed a recognisable cause of action, was time-barred, constituted an abuse of process, and complied with pleading requirements.

1. Defendant’s application allowed. The claim was struck out and dismissed. The claimant’s application to strike out the defendant’s application was also dismissed.
2. Under Civil Procedure Rules 1998 rule 3.4(2)(a) and (b), a statement of case may be struck out where it discloses no reasonable grounds, is unreasonably vague or incoherent, is vexatious, or is otherwise abusive or ill-founded.
3. The Particulars of Claim disclosed no proper cause of action against the defendant. The allegations of fraud were unsupported. A solicitor’s preparation of a draft order for a judge’s approval is an ordinary procedural step and does not, without more, establish fraud.
4. The claim was, in substance, an attempt to relitigate the earlier Medway County Court proceedings and to challenge orders made in 2008 and 2009. That constituted an abuse of process. The proper route for challenging those orders was an appeal, and the claimant’s earlier applications for permission to appeal had been dismissed.
5. Any tort claim was statute-barred under section 2 of the Limitation Act 1980, since the relevant matters were known many years earlier and, at the latest, by September 2010.
6. Rule 3.4(2)(c) was also engaged because the Particulars of Claim failed to comply with Civil Procedure Rules 1998 rule 16.4(1) and Practice Direction 16, paragraph 8.2, including the requirement for a concise statement of facts and specific pleading of fraud.

not stated in the judgment.