BARCLAYS BANK PLC v BAVAGUTHU RAGHURAM SHETTY

A foreign judgment from the DIFC may be enforced in England and Wales at common law where it is final and conclusive, for a definite monetary sum, and given by a court having jurisdiction under English conflict-of-laws principles. Enforcement may be resisted only on limited grounds, including fraud, public policy and substantial procedural injustice. The English court does not reopen the foreign judgment’s merits.

An adjournment must be granted where proceeding would be unfair, but the applicant must establish a genuine need. A late application unsupported by evidence, especially where the alleged difficulty is self-created and the enforcement issues are narrow, will not ordinarily justify adjournment. Summary judgment is appropriate where there is no real prospect of resisting enforcement and no other compelling reason for trial.

Barclays sought enforcement in England of judgments of the DIFC Court requiring Dr Shetty to pay approximately US$131.44 million under a guarantee relating to UAE Exchange’s foreign-exchange liabilities.

Dr Shetty applied to adjourn Barclays’ summary judgment application until after April 2022, asserting that Indian freezing orders prevented him from funding legal representation. Barclays opposed the adjournment and sought summary judgment under Civil Procedure Rules 1998, rule 24.2.

The court first considered whether the adjournment was necessary for a fair hearing. It then considered whether the DIFC judgments were final and conclusive, for a definite sum, given by a court of competent jurisdiction, and impeachable for fraud, public policy or natural justice reasons, and whether any other compelling reason required a trial.

1. Adjournment. The application was dismissed. The governing question was whether proceeding would be fair in all the circumstances. The applicant bore the burden of showing a genuine need for an adjournment. Fairness to both parties was relevant, but inconvenience and delay ordinarily carried less weight than the prevention of an unfair hearing. The evidence did not establish that Dr Shetty’s inability to obtain representation was genuine or unavoidable. There was no adequate explanation for the failure to seek variation of the Indian freezing orders earlier, no reliable evidence that representation would become available within the proposed period, and no satisfactory explanation of how other substantial litigation had been funded.
2. The enforcement proceedings were materially narrower than the underlying DIFC litigation. The English court could not retry the merits of the guarantee claim. The absence of any arguable enforcement defence supported the conclusion that the late application was a delaying tactic and that proceeding without further adjournment was fair.
3. Common-law enforcement. The DIFC judgments were final and conclusive, notwithstanding that an appeal could have been brought. They were judgments for a definite monetary sum and were not judgments for taxes, fines or penalties. The DIFC Court had jurisdiction because the parties had agreed to submit to it and because Dr Shetty had participated in the proceedings and defended the merits.
4. A foreign judgment is not impeachable merely because it may contain an error of fact or law. The recognised grounds include fraud, public policy and breach of the principles of natural justice. None was arguably established. The fraud allegations concerned the underlying transactions rather than fraud in obtaining the DIFC judgments. There was no evidence of procedural unfairness or any public-policy objection.
5. Summary judgment and counterclaim. Dr Shetty had no real prospect of successfully resisting enforcement. A speculative possibility of a regulatory damages claim did not constitute a compelling reason for trial. Any counterclaim based on matters determined or capable of being raised in the DIFC proceedings risked abuse of process or an impermissible attack on the foreign judgment. Barclays was therefore entitled to summary judgment.