High Speed Two (HS2) Limited & Anor v Persons Unknown & Ors

An injunction may prohibit conduct in ordinary, non-technical language and may identify lawful activities by exception. It need not list every lawful activity that is not prohibited. Where an injunction concerns persons unknown, questions about knowledge of the order and its terms may appropriately be left to committal proceedings, where they can be determined on evidence. Service provisions must be assessed practically and may be sufficient where they are reasonably capable of bringing the order to widespread attention. A statutory right to immediate possession does not depend on works being imminent where the legislation contains no such requirement.

The claimants sought continuing injunctive relief concerning land connected with the High Speed Two railway scheme. Following circulation of the draft judgment, the sixth defendant proposed amendments to the draft injunction order and sought permission to appeal.

The proposed amendments concerned separate orders for different defendants, consequence wording, knowledge of the injunction, demarcation of land, the claimants’ right to possession, the relationship between property rights and protest rights, the definition of prohibited conduct, and service. The court determined those consequential matters and the application for permission to appeal.

1. Application refused. The court declined the proposed amendments and refused permission to appeal under CPR r 52.6(1), holding that the proposed grounds were unarguable, had no realistic prospect of success, and disclosed no compelling reason for an appeal.
2. The claimants’ statutory rights under the Phase One Act and the Phase 2a Act entitled them to possession of the relevant HS2 land, or gave them an immediate right to possession, once the relevant statutory notices had been served. The legislation did not require works to be imminent before that right arose. A contrary construction would facilitate disruptive protest tactics.
3. The claimants could rely on their A1P1 rights against the defendants’ Articles 10 and 11 rights. The court considered itself bound by existing authority and followed the judgments of Arnold J in the Olympic Delivery Authority cases, which it regarded as correct.
4. The injunction did not define prohibited conduct by reference to legal causes of action. Paragraphs 3 and 5 used ordinary language, while paragraph 4 preserved lawful activities. It was neither necessary nor practicable to enumerate every lawful activity on the highway.
5. The prohibition on deliberately obstructing or interfering with the free movement of vehicles was sufficiently clear. The reference to deliberate slow walking illustrated conduct falling within the prohibition. The insertion of deliberate conduct protected disabled or mobility-impaired persons who might temporarily delay a vehicle unintentionally.
6. The service provisions were extensive and satisfied the Canada Goose requirements. Personal service was required where the claimants became aware of a defendant’s identity, unless it was not reasonably practicable. Questions concerning knowledge of the injunction were appropriately reserved for any committal proceedings.

Not an appellate judgment. The judgment does not state any prior appellate history.