Kanwarjit Singh Juj v John Lewis Partnership Plc

An occupier’s status and duty under the Occupiers Liability Act 1957 depend on the nature and extent of the control exercised over the relevant risk. A person with limited control may be an occupier for limited purposes, including interim measures or warnings. However, the common duty of care is fact-sensitive and proportionate. No warning or remedial step is required where the risk is obvious, readily appreciable, and the visitor can take reasonable care for their own safety. An accident caused by a visitor’s misjudged movement, rather than by any breach of duty, remains a true accident. An appeal succeeds only where the lower court’s decision is wrong because of an identifiable reasoning flaw or unsupported factual finding.

The appellant appealed from the dismissal of his personal injury claim by HHJ Backhouse in the Central London County Court. He had fallen on a kerb in a disabled parking bay adjacent to a Waitrose store and alleged that John Lewis Partnership Plc, trading as Waitrose, was liable under the Occupiers Liability Act 1957.

The car park was owned and operated by the London Borough of Hillingdon. The respondent had no legal interest in it but had some involvement with customer use, inspections, temporary safety measures and reports to the local authority. The central issues were whether the respondent was an occupier, the extent of its duty, whether the kerb created an unreasonable danger, whether any breach caused the accident, and whether the appeal should be allowed.

1. Appeal dismissed. The respondent was an occupier of the car park for limited purposes because it exercised material, though restricted, control over immediate hazards, interim measures and communications with the local authority.
2. The judge below had correctly identified the control-based test. The respondent had no control over the bay’s design, construction, structural alteration, painting, or long-term closure. Its control did, however, extend to warning signage where reasonably necessary and to reiterating unresolved concerns to the local authority with reasonable frequency.
3. The common duty under sections 1(1), 1(2), 2(2) and 2(3) of the Occupiers Liability Act 1957 remained fact-sensitive and proportionate. The relevant danger was the kerb and the need to manoeuvre beside it. But the bay, the kerb, its height, colour and position were obvious and readily appreciable. The appellant was not under pressure and was free to take reasonable care. There was therefore no duty to warn visitors or report the danger to the local authority.
4. The earlier accidents did not alter that conclusion. Only four, or possibly five, incidents had been recorded amid extensive use of the bay, and the evidence did not establish a risk requiring precautionary action. Questions about what the local authority would have done therefore fell away because no reporting duty existed.
5. In any event, the appellant had known of the kerb, had walked around it into an adjacent bay, and had misjudged his attempt to step onto it. Neither the danger identified by the lower judge nor any breach by the respondent caused the accident. The accident was therefore a true accident, and the claim could not succeed.
6. The appeal court applied the requirement that an appeal lies only where the lower decision was wrong because of an identifiable flaw in reasoning or an unsupported factual finding. The judge’s finding that the bay presented a danger other than an obvious one was unreasonable, but that error did not affect the outcome.

• Central London County Court: HHJ Backhouse dismissed the appellant’s liability claim and ordered costs, subject to further order.
• High Court (King’s Bench Division): The appeal was dismissed. The lower court’s reasoning concerning the scope of the respondent’s duty was partly corrected, but the claim remained unsuccessful because no relevant breach existed and the accident was not caused by the respondent.