AXX v Piotr Zajac

The vulnerability provisions in Practice Direction 1A provide a structured reasoning tool for identifying vulnerability, its effects on participation, and proportionate case-management adjustments. They should be applied purposively and are not an exhaustive code or provisions to be construed narrowly as if statutory.

Putting evidence before the court may include doing so indirectly through cooperation with medical experts, enabling expert evidence to represent the vulnerable party’s condition adequately. A split trial may therefore be proportionate where resolving an issue first could improve participation, treatment prospects and the quality of later evidence, even if it creates some risk of additional cost. Sanctions for refusal to undergo medical examination require an informed assessment of capacity and fairness.

The claimant brought a personal injury claim arising from a road traffic accident. He alleged a traumatic brain injury, psychosis, post-traumatic stress disorder and other psychiatric consequences. The defendant disputed causation.

The claimant was accepted to be vulnerable because of his mental health condition. He had engaged only minimally, or not at all, with some medical experts, and was not taking antipsychotic medication. The claimant sought a split trial dealing first with causation, partly because a favourable causation decision might enable an interim payment and improved treatment or case management. The defendant opposed the application on grounds including delay, cost and evidential overlap.

The court also considered whether refusal to undergo examination should lead automatically to a stay.

1. Split trial ordered. The court directed a separate trial under Rule 3.1(2)(i) concerning whether the accident caused a traumatic brain injury, whether any such injury caused post-accident psychiatric symptoms, and whether the accident otherwise caused post-traumatic stress disorder.
2. The claimant’s mental health condition brought him within PD1A.1(3)(d). His vulnerability potentially impaired the abilities identified in PD1A.1(5)(a)–(f), including understanding the proceedings, putting evidence before the court, responding to court requests, instructing representatives and attending hearings. The court should identify the particular likely effects rather than proceed at a general level.
3. “Putting their evidence before the court” in PD1A.1(5)(c) includes indirect presentation through cooperation with medical experts. The provision is to be read consistently with Article 6 rights, equalities duties and the overriding objective of placing parties as far as possible on an equal footing.
4. Separating causation from quantum was proportionate. It offered a real prospect of enabling treatment and later cooperation with experts, and of producing clearer prognosis evidence. The possible increase in costs and duplication of evidence did not outweigh those benefits on the facts. The court’s duty was to mitigate, so far as practicable, the effects of vulnerability.
5. The vulnerability provisions operate as part of the court’s wider duty to secure fair hearings and fair case management. They do not replace rules applicable where a party lacks capacity to conduct litigation. They may nevertheless inform adjustments for vulnerable parties or witnesses.
6. The court declined to impose an automatic stay. The claimant was ordered to make himself available for examination by the defendant’s experts. If he refused, the issue could be restored for assessment of his capacity to consent to examination and consideration of necessary steps. A stay or debarring order should be imposed only on an informed basis and after fairness to both parties had been weighed.
7. Disability adaptations appointments may complement the PD1A process in complex cases, and the Equal Treatment Bench Book provides relevant guidance as best practice, although it is not law.

Not an appeal. The judgment records no prior decision requiring appellate review.