NORTH WARWICKSHIRE BOROUGH COUNCIL v SHEILA SHATFORD & Ors

For civil contempt arising from breach of an injunction, the court must determine penalty by reference to punishment, securing future compliance and rehabilitation. Criminal sentencing guidelines may provide a useful analogy, but they must be adapted to the lower sentencing powers and different nature of civil contempt.

Deliberate, non-violent protest undertaken for conscientious reasons may still cross the custody threshold where the disruption, public impact and demands on police resources are sufficiently serious. Even then, suspension of imprisonment may be appropriate for a first breach where future compliance can reasonably be secured.

The claimant obtained an interim injunction prohibiting protests against fossil-fuel activity at Kingsbury Oil Terminal and specified obstructive conduct. The defendants admitted that they breached the injunction by participating in a peaceful protest which obstructed access to the terminal.

The court determined the appropriate penalties for Stephen Gingell, Richard Morgan and Holly Exley. The issues included the applicable sentencing framework, the seriousness of the disruption and its effect on the public and policing resources, the significance of the defendants’ conscientious motives and admissions, whether imprisonment crossed the custody threshold, and whether the sentences should be suspended.

1. Liability and standard of proof. The proceedings were civil proceedings, but the alleged contempts had to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. The defendants’ admissions and the police evidence established breaches of paragraphs 1(a), 1(b)(iii) and 1(b)(ix) of the injunction.
2. Sentencing framework. In accordance with Willoughby v Solihull MBC [2013] EWCA Civ 699, the relevant objectives were punishment, securing future compliance and rehabilitation. The criminal guideline for breach of a criminal behaviour order could be used by analogy, as indicated in Amicus Horizon Ltd v Thorley [2012] EWCA Civ 817, but required adjustment because civil contempt had a maximum sentence of two years and lacked the criminal courts’ range of community orders.
3. Seriousness. The defendants acted deliberately and fell within category B culpability. The protest obstructed the terminal for at least four and a half hours, affected access by oil tankers and some workers, impacted the public highway and required substantial police resources, including mutual aid. The harm therefore fell between categories 1 and 2. The absence of previous convictions, the defendants’ otherwise law-abiding lives, their conscientious motives and their first breach were mitigating features.
4. Custody and suspension. The contempt crossed the custody threshold. A sentence of 56 days’ imprisonment was reduced to 37 days for admissions at the first reasonable opportunity and then to 23 days to reflect seven days spent on remand. Applying Cuadrilla Bowland Ltd and Others v Persons Unknown [2020] EWCA Civ 9, the court suspended each sentence for two years on condition of compliance with any interim or final injunction relating to protest activity at the terminal. Peaceful protest remained permissible outside the injunction’s red boundary, subject to compliance with the order.
5. Orders. The defendants were released, subject to custodial processing and any unrelated detention. Costs contributions of £320.77 were ordered, payable immediately by Gingell and Exley and by instalments by Morgan.