The Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, R (on the application of) v The Police Appeals Tribunal

On an appeal under rule 4(4)(a) of the Police Appeals Tribunal Rules 2012, the tribunal must decide whether the misconduct finding was outside the range of reasonable findings open to the misconduct panel. It must not substitute its own view merely because it would have assessed the evidence differently, or because the panel’s reasoning contained an evidential deficiency, where the outcome remained reasonably available. A successful rule 4(4)(a) appeal will ordinarily finally determine the disciplinary allegations, since the tribunal has no ordinary power to remit. Judicial review of the tribunal’s decision is concerned with public law error. The PAT’s decision was quashed because it applied the wrong test and irrationally concluded that the panel could not reasonably have found gross misconduct proved.

The Commissioner challenged the Police Appeals Tribunal’s decision allowing two police officers’ appeals against misconduct findings arising from a road accident. The misconduct panel had found that both officers knowingly gave inaccurate accounts and had committed gross misconduct. The PAT concluded that the panel’s findings were unreasonable under rule 4(4)(a), substituted its own finding that the allegations were not proved, and relied heavily on perceived failures to engage with expert evidence about memory.

The judicial review raised the proper meaning and application of “unreasonable”, the consequences of a successful rule 4(4)(a) appeal, alleged procedural unfairness and irrationality, and whether the PAT had lawfully substituted its own determination.

1. Ground 1 allowed. Rule 4(4)(a) of the Police Appeals Tribunal Rules 2012 requires the PAT to ask whether the finding of misconduct or gross misconduct was within the range of reasonable findings open to the panel. The test is not whether the PAT disagrees with the panel, would have reached a different conclusion, or identifies a failure to refer expressly to particular evidence.
2. The PAT misdirected itself. Its reasoning treated a demonstrable misunderstanding or failure to consider evidence, and inadequacy of reasoning, as sufficient in themselves. It also reassessed the evidence and credibility rather than deciding whether the panel’s conclusion was outside the permissible range.
3. The panel’s conclusion that the officers had acted dishonestly was reasonably open to it. The panel had heard and assessed the officers, identified evidence capable of supporting its conclusion, and was entitled to regard the expert memory evidence as of little assistance because it established only the possibility or plausibility of honest mistaken recollection and could not determine whether the officers had lied.
4. Grounds 2 and 3. There was no free-standing procedural unfairness in the PAT’s procedure. In a rule 4(4)(a) appeal, there will ordinarily be no distinct gateway and substantive-determination stages. However, because the PAT had not lawfully found the rule 4(4)(a) test satisfied, it had no lawful basis to substitute its own determination.
5. Ground 4 allowed. If the correct test had been applied, it was irrational to conclude that finding gross misconduct proved was outside the range of reasonable findings available to the panel. Both proving and not proving the allegations were reasonably open on the evidence.
6. The PAT’s decision was quashed. The agreed consequential order was that the appeals of both interested parties were dismissed.

This was a judicial review claim in the Administrative Court. The Police Appeals Tribunal had allowed the interested parties’ appeals under rule 4(4)(a) of the Police Appeals Tribunal Rules 2012, quashed the misconduct panel’s findings and substituted findings that the allegations were not proved. The Administrative Court quashed that decision and dismissed the appeals.