Enreach UK Limited & Anor v Inreach Group Limited

Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 does not ordinarily make a claimant a victim merely because secondary legislation may reduce the prospects of success in separate proceedings. The alleged interference must be direct and must not be hypothetical or speculative. A party that acquires trade mark rights after a statutory regime has been established cannot generally invoke the Human Rights Act 1998 to obtain the benefit of an earlier legal regime. Where secondary legislation establishes a trade mark standing requirement pursuant to a specific statutory power, and pursues legitimate aims such as certainty and harmonisation, disapplication will not be justified without a sufficiently direct interference and a disproportionate impact.

The claimants challenged the defendant’s trade marks under sections 5(2)(b) and 47(2) of the Trade Marks Act 1994, relying on an earlier mark owned by a third party. Article 5 of the Trade Marks (Relative Grounds) Order 2007 restricted applications for invalidity on relative grounds to the proprietor or licensee of the earlier mark.

The claimants argued that Article 5 should be disapplied because its operation exposed their trade marks, goodwill and other property to an increased risk of adverse proceedings, contrary to Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. The defendant applied for summary judgment or strike-out on the basis that the claim had no real prospect of success and disclosed no reasonable grounds.

1. Application granted. The claimants’ pleaded case had no real prospect of success and disclosed no reasonable grounds. Summary judgment was entered for the defendant and the Particulars of Claim were ordered to be struck out.
2. Under CPR 24.2, summary judgment is appropriate where the opposing party has no real, as distinct from fanciful, prospect of success and there is no other compelling reason for trial. Under CPR 3.4(2)(a), the court must be certain that the statement of case is bound to fail. Although developing questions of law may ordinarily be better determined at trial, that caution did not apply because the relevant facts and arguments were before the court.
3. The claimants were not victims for the purposes of section 7(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998. Their alleged prejudice depended on a chain of contingent findings about trade mark similarity and validity. The risk was therefore hypothetical or speculative, rather than direct.
4. The 2007 Order did not create or increase the risk to the claimants’ property. The risk arose from their decision to trade under marks which might conflict with an earlier mark, after the standing regime was already in force. They had acquired their asserted rights within that statutory framework.
5. Even assuming an interference, it would be justified under paragraph 2 of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. The standing requirement pursued legitimate public interests: harmonising the UK system, increasing certainty for registered marks and limiting challenges to persons with a proprietary interest. The measure was proportionate, and the court was entitled to respect the legislative margin of appreciation.
6. The argument that section 6(2) of the Human Rights Act 1998 independently prevented disapplication was arguable but was not determined. The court also declined to decide finally whether the 2007 Order should be treated as effectively modifying section 47(3) for that purpose.

Consequential matters were left for a further order.