A & D Computers Limited v Nottingham County Council

Under section 64 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980, costs are discretionary and must be determined by what is just and reasonable in all the circumstances. Costs do not automatically follow the event, but the court must consider the whole conduct of the proceedings. The special protection afforded to public authorities applies where proceedings arise from administrative or regulatory duties; it does not apply to civil forfeiture proceedings brought under section 97 of the Trade Marks Act 1994. A party, whether public or private, must be ready to pursue proceedings conscientiously. An appellate court may intervene where the lower court has materially misdirected itself or failed to balance relevant factors. The costs decision was quashed and remitted for assessment.

A & D Computers Limited appealed by way of case stated from the Nottingham Magistrates’ Court. The magistrates’ court had dismissed Nottingham County Council’s forfeiture complaint under section 97 of the Trade Marks Act 1994 because the Council was unable to present its case at the listed hearing. The District Judge then refused to award the company its costs.

The appeal concerned the correct approach under section 64 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980, the relevance of the Council’s conduct during the proceedings, the scope of the special costs principles applicable to public authorities, and whether the District Judge had exceeded his discretion.

1. The appeal was allowed. The District Judge’s decision not to award costs involved a material misdirection of law and exceeded the generous ambit within which reasonable disagreement was possible.

2. Section 64 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 confers a broad discretion to make such order as to costs as is just and reasonable. The first two propositions in City of Bradford Metropolitan District Council v Booth apply generally: the court may order costs to follow the event, but is not required to do so, and must consider all relevant circumstances.

3. The third Booth proposition, which gives additional protection to public authorities acting in the discharge of administrative or regulatory duties, did not apply. The forfeiture proceedings were civil rather than regulatory in character. The Respondent accepted that position on the basis of R v Harrow Crown Court (ex parte UNIC Centre SARL).

4. The District Judge nevertheless treated the Respondent’s reasonableness when commencing the proceedings as the critical question. That approach wrongly imported the third Booth proposition and unduly confined the discretion. The court had to consider the Respondent’s conduct throughout the proceedings, including its failure to secure alternative representation for a hearing fixed months earlier after repeated warnings about the importance of court time.

5. The Respondent was in the same position as any other litigant. Its inability to present the complaint caused the Appellant to incur costs unnecessarily, and the public interest in protecting authorities from the costs consequences of properly performed statutory duties was not engaged. It was therefore just and convenient for the Respondent to pay the Appellant’s costs.

6. The High Court reversed and quashed the costs decision, answered questions (i) to (iii) in the affirmative, and remitted the assessment of costs to the District Judge under section 28A(3)(b) of the Senior Courts Act 1981. Question (iv) did not require determination.

• High Court (Administrative Court): appeal by way of case stated allowed to the extent that the magistrates’ court costs decision was reversed and the assessment of costs was remitted to the District Judge.
• Nottingham Magistrates’ Court: on 2 August 2021, the complaint under section 97 of the Trade Marks Act 1994 was dismissed and no order for costs was made.