MZ v FZ & Ors

A married father’s parental responsibility cannot be rescinded under the Children Act 1989. However, the court may impose comprehensive prohibited steps, specific issue and injunctive orders which can remove, in practical terms, the parent’s ability to exercise parental responsibility. The retention of the legal status of parenthood alone does not necessarily interfere with Convention rights where effective protective remedies are available.

The statutory distinction between married and unmarried parents remains justified under Articles 8 and 14 of the Convention. The inability to apply for revocation of a married father’s parental responsibility does not, without more, reach the minimum severity required under Article 3 or establish a failure by the State to provide reasonable protection against domestic abuse. A declaration of incompatibility was therefore refused.

The applicant mother sought protective orders under the Children Act 1989 against the father of two children. The orders included prohibited steps and specific issue orders, restrictions on further applications, and measures preventing the father from obtaining information about the children or their mother.

She also sought a declaration that sections 2 and 4 of the Act were incompatible with Articles 3, 8 and 14 of the Convention because a married father’s parental responsibility could not be revoked, unlike that of certain unmarried parents. The father did not participate substantively. The central issue was whether the statutory scheme was incompatible despite the availability of extensive orders restricting the exercise of parental responsibility.

1. Protective orders. The court accepted the mother’s evidence of prolonged domestic abuse, coercive and controlling behaviour, stalking, harassment and breaches of protective orders. The evidence justified the comprehensive orders already made under the Children Act 1989, including orders restricting the father’s exercise of parental responsibility, changing the children’s names, restricting further applications and preventing disclosure of information.
2. Extent of parental responsibility. Parental responsibility under section 3 comprises duties, powers, responsibilities and authority relating to the child and the child’s property. It is to be exercised for the child’s benefit. Although the court cannot extinguish a married father’s parental responsibility, it may prohibit the parent from taking any steps in its exercise where that is necessary, proportionate and in the child’s best interests, applying the welfare paramountcy principle and the section 1(3) checklist. The orders in this case effectively removed the father’s ability to exercise parental responsibility, leaving the legal status of parenthood.
3. Convention rights. The distinction between the irrevocable parental responsibility of married parents and the revocable parental responsibility of certain unmarried parents was consistent with the Strasbourg authorities. The practical difference remaining after the protective orders was limited to the retention of legal status. That residual distinction did not amount to an interference with Article 8 rights or discrimination contrary to Article 14.
4. The court rejected the argument that the statutory scheme failed to provide protection against domestic abuse. The available orders were effective and reasonable in the circumstances. The distress caused by the inability to seek revocation was principally attributable to the father’s conduct, not to the statutory scheme, and did not meet the minimum level of severity under Article 3.
5. The application was brought by the mother alone. The court therefore did not determine possible Convention arguments belonging independently to the children. It declined to make a declaration of incompatibility under section 4 of the Human Rights Act 1998.