GFH Capital Limited v David Lawrence Haigh & Ors.

A freezing order must be construed sensibly in its procedural and substantive context. Where an order is granted in support of substantive proceedings in another jurisdiction and continues until disposal of the Claim, that expression refers to the substantive proceedings identified in the order, rather than to later or related proceedings in another claim number. The order expires on its own terms when those substantive proceedings are finally determined. The court may then declare that the order stands discharged, without deciding alternative grounds for discharge that have become unnecessary.

The claimant obtained a freezing order in 2014 in support of substantive proceedings against Mr Haigh before the first instance court of the Dubai International Financial Centre. The order restrained dealings with assets in England and Wales until disposal of the Claim or further order. The freezing order was later varied by Flaux J.

By 2017, substantive proceedings and related interlocutory steps were being pursued under a different English claim number. Mr Haigh applied in 2021 for the freezing order to be discharged against the defendants. The central issue was whether the 2014 order remained in force after the DIFC proceedings were finally determined on 4 July 2018.

1. Application granted. The freezing order made by Flaux J in December 2014 was declared discharged, having expired on its own terms on 4 July 2018.
2. The order had to be construed in its context. It was granted at the outset of the wider litigation and expressly referred to a freezing order made in the DIFC proceedings. The sensible meaning of the Claim in the operative paragraph was therefore the substantive claim before the DIFC court.
3. The distinction between pre-judgment and post-judgment relief supported that construction. The injunction was granted pending final determination of the substantive DIFC claim. That claim was finally determined by the judgment of Sir Jeremy Cooke sitting as a DIFC judge on 4 July 2018. The English freezing order consequently expired at that date without requiring a further discharge order.
4. The court did not determine the alternative arguments that the order should be discharged because there was no continuing purpose, no relevant material assets, or no continuing risk of dissipation. Those matters had not been reached because the logically prior construction point disposed of the application. Nothing in the judgment ruled for or against those submissions in any future recovery proceedings.
5. The formal order was to be drawn in appropriate terms and expressed in both the 2014 and 2017 claims, subject to checking the relevant claim reference.