R v Jason Lawrence

In assessing publicly funded criminal appeal fees, the determining officer must allow reasonable remuneration by applying the relevant factors, including importance, complexity, skill, labour, responsibility, documents and time. The task is to assess the claim in the individual case, not to fix a general or customary rate. Comparisons with fees allowed in other cases cannot replace that assessment. Irrelevant economic material and habitual reductions of claimed rates are improper. A reasonable attendance fee may include the hearing day and necessary travel, in addition to preparation, where the overall remuneration is appropriate.

Counsel appealed under Criminal Legal Aid (Remuneration) Regulations 2013 against the determining officer’s assessment of fees for representing Jason Lawrance in a significant Court of Appeal appeal. The determining officer reduced the preparation time and allowed an hourly rate of £200 rather than the £250 claimed. A separate attendance fee of £500 was allowed instead of £1,000.

The appeal concerned the proper assessment of preparation time, the reasonableness of counsel’s hourly rate, and the appropriate fee for attendance at the Court of Appeal hearing.

1. Appeal allowed. Counsel was entitled to the claimed preparation time, hourly rate and attendance fee. The appropriate additional payment was to be made, together with £1,750 exclusive of VAT for the appeal costs and the £100 appeal fee.
2. The Taxing Officer’s Notes for Guidance (2002), paragraph 1.11, identify the relevant factors for assessing reasonable counsel’s fees. They include the importance of the case, complexity, skill, labour, specialised knowledge, responsibility, documents, time and all other relevant circumstances.
3. The determining officer’s task is to allow the reasonable rate in the particular case, rather than to fix the going rate. Comparing the hourly rates claimed or allowed in other appeals is not a substitute for applying the relevant factors. It is possible that counsel has undervalued a rate in one case and not overvalued it in another.
4. The appeal involved a novel and legally significant issue concerning consent and deception in rape cases. The determining officer had given insufficient weight to the time required to research the authorities and similar jurisdictions. The claimed 28.25 hours for preparing the advice and grounds were reasonable.
5. The rate of £250 per hour was reasonable. The privately funded rates referred to in Evans v The Serious Fraud Office [2015] EWHC 1525 (QB) were not directly comparable, but they demonstrated that there was substantial scope between publicly and privately funded rates. Reliance on irrelevant material, including income and overhead calculations, could not justify reducing counsel’s reasonable rate.
6. A basic fee intended to resemble a brief fee includes preparation and the first hearing day. A separate attendance fee may nevertheless be allowed where appropriate. On the facts, the Court of Appeal hearing was listed for a day and necessary travel formed part of the attendance, making the claimed £1,000 reasonable.

The appeal was brought under Regulation 29 of the Criminal Legal Aid (Remuneration) Regulations 2013 against the determining officer’s assessment of counsel’s fees. The High Court (Senior Courts Costs Office) allowed the appeal.