Joseph Ejiofor, R (on the application of) v The Commissioner for Local Administration in England & Anor

Section 30(3) of the Local Government Act 1974 protects confidentiality generally. Naming a person in an ombudsman’s report does not, without more, signify an enhanced level of personal censure. The statutory question is whether naming is necessary after considering the public interest and the relevant interests. “Necessary” has no special technical meaning in this context. A court should respect the ombudsman’s evaluative judgment where the decision is rational and procedurally fair. A challenge to a published report must be brought promptly, ordinarily with urgent consideration of interim relief.

The claimant sought judicial review of the Local Government and Social Care Ombudsman’s decision to name him in a report concerning maladministration by a local authority. He had been the authority’s leader when the challenged decision was made. The claim alleged errors in construing section 30(3) of the Local Government Act 1974, failure to consider his interests, application of the wrong necessity test, procedural unfairness and inadequate reasons. Permission had previously been refused on the papers. The renewed application raised whether the naming decision was unlawful and whether relief remained appropriate after publication and substantial delay.

1. Renewed application refused. The claim was not brought promptly. The report had been published on 10 January 2022, but the claim was not issued until 8 April 2022, without an application for interim relief or expedition. Delay was a powerful reason to refuse permission, subject to the substantive merits.
2. Section 30(3) did not create a calibrated scale of personal censure. Its purpose was to protect confidentiality generally where appropriate. Naming the claimant was distinct from identifying him as the council leader, which was necessary to make the report intelligible. The claimant was therefore not entitled to rely on an alleged enhanced censure arising from the use of his name.
3. The defendant applied the statutory test of necessity. The reference in the report to the public interest was a reasonable plain-English paraphrase of that test. The underlying note showed consideration of the claimant’s role, the difficulty of anonymising him, transparency and accountability, and the public interest. “Necessary” had no special technical meaning in this context.
4. The claimant’s interests were sufficiently considered. His political reputation was the obvious relevant interest, and it was implicit in the decision whether to name him. As an elected council leader acting in that capacity, no general expectation of confidentiality in scrutiny of his actions had been established.
5. The opportunity to comment was reasonable and sufficient. Sending the draft to the council with an express instruction to share it with the claimant was not arguably unfair. The reasons were also sufficient: the rationale was simple, and the investigator’s contemporaneous note supplied any further explanation required.

Permission for judicial review had previously been refused on the papers by Heather Williams J on 5 July 2022. The renewed application was refused by the High Court (Administrative Court).