THE KING (STEPHEN WHITESIDE) v THE COUNCIL OF THE LONDON BOROUGH OF CROYDON

In a planning permission challenge, the scope of an authority’s delegation is determined primarily by the committee’s resolution. An officer’s report may provide context, but its contents are not automatically incorporated into the resolution. A requirement for a section 106 agreement to secure a particular measure should be stated clearly or reserved for further committee consideration.

Regulation 122 does not require precise quantification of every planning obligation in every case. The necessary level of detail depends on the circumstances. A modest contribution towards a range of sustainable transport initiatives may satisfy the requirement that it relate fairly and reasonably in scale and kind to the development. Later evidence may elucidate the decision-making background, but should not fundamentally alter or fill a gap in the reasons. The claim was dismissed.

The claimant challenged the defendant authority’s grant of planning permission for the demolition of a dwelling and garage and construction of seven residential units. The permission was subject to a section 106 contribution of £10,500 towards sustainable transport initiatives and conditions concerning electric vehicle charging points.

The claimant argued that the planning committee had authorised delegation only on the basis that the agreement secured three years’ free car-club membership for each residential unit, and that the authority lacked sufficient evidence to satisfy regulation 122 of the Community Infrastructure Levy Regulations 2010. The court considered the scope of the committee’s resolution, the adequacy of the information before it, the relevance of later evidence, and whether relief should be refused in any event.

1. Ground 1 dismissed. The committee’s resolution, rather than the officer’s report, was the instrument of delegation. The report provided context but was not automatically incorporated into the resolution. The resolution required a financial contribution for sustainable transport improvements and did not expressly require the section 106 agreement to secure free car-club membership or require the matter to return to the committee. The court applied the approach in R (Flynn) v London Borough of Southwark Council [2021] EWCA Civ 827.
2. The officer’s report was to be read with reasonable benevolence. The relevant question was whether it materially misled the committee on a matter bearing on its decision, applying the principles in R (Mansell) v Tonbridge and Malling Borough Council and Others [2017] EWCA Civ 1314. No material misdirection was established.
3. Ground 2 dismissed. Regulation 122(2) of the Community Infrastructure Levy Regulations 2010 required the obligation to be necessary, directly related to the development, and fairly and reasonably related in scale and kind. The court applied R (Tesco Stores Ltd) v Forest of Dean District Council [2015] EWCA Civ 800: appropriate rigour was required, but quantification was not necessary in every case. Given the modest contribution of £1,500 per unit and the identified sustainable transport purposes, the committee was entitled to conclude that the requirement was satisfied.
4. Evidence filed after the decision could be considered if it elucidated, rather than altered or fundamentally contradicted, the original reasons. Applying R (United Trade Union Action Group Ltd) & Anor v Transport for London & Anor [2021] EWCA Civ 1197, the court accepted the authority’s evidence as permissible elucidation.
5. In any event, if ground 2 had succeeded, relief would have been refused under section 31(2A) of the Senior Courts Act 1981, because it was highly likely that the committee would have reached the same decision. The claim therefore failed. Consequential matters were left to written submissions if necessary.