TL v SECRETARY OF STATE FOR HOME DEPARTMENT

On a review of Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures, the court must apply judicial-review principles and assess whether the statutory conditions were met both when the measures were imposed and at the hearing. The court must reach its own view, while giving appropriate weight to the Secretary of State’s assessment on necessity and proportionality, particularly in the national-security context.

Mental-health evidence may be relevant both to whether conduct amounts to terrorism-related activity and to whether measures are necessary and proportionate. The Secretary of State must keep demonstrating those matters; the individual is not required to prove that the measures have ceased to be justified. Progress under a desistance programme is relevant but is not the sole means of demonstrating changed circumstances.

The Secretary of State obtained permission under section 6 of the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 to impose TPIMs on TL. A TPIM notice was served on 16 March 2021 and later extended for a further year. Because the statutory review and appeal proceedings were delayed, they were heard together.

TL challenged the measures on grounds concerning his mental health, the absence of recent open evidence of terrorism-related activity, disclosure of closed material, and alleged deficiencies in the Desistance and Disengagement Programme. The central issues were whether conditions A, C and D remained satisfied and whether the Secretary of State’s decisions were lawful and proportionate.

1. Outcome. The application for review and the appeal against extension of the TPIM notice were both dismissed. The court also rejected the closed-case challenges.
2. The court’s role under sections 9 and 16 of the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 is governed by judicial-review principles. It must assess the position both at the date of the Secretary of State’s decision and at the hearing. The intensity of review varies with the condition under consideration. For conditions C and D, the court must reach its own view on necessity and proportionality, while giving weight to the Secretary of State’s judgment in the national-security context.
3. Mental-health evidence may bear on the interpretation of conduct relied upon to establish condition A. It may also bear on necessity and proportionality under conditions C and D. The Secretary of State had properly considered TL’s developing mental-health evidence at each relevant stage. The court was satisfied that TL had been involved in terrorism-related activity and that the TPIMs remained necessary and proportionate.
4. The absence of recent open evidence did not provide an independent ground of challenge. Condition A did not require recent terrorism-related activity, and condition B was not material because this was the first TPIM notice. The timing of the activity remained relevant to the necessity and proportionality assessment, but conditions C and D were satisfied.
5. The disclosure challenge failed. CPR Part 80 provided a procedure for seeking disclosure of closed material into open. The special advocates had acted conscientiously, and the open evidence gave TL substantial material to answer.
6. The Desistance and Disengagement Programme was not the only means by which continued necessity or proportionality could be assessed. The burden remained on the Secretary of State to demonstrate justification at imposition, review and extension. The period since the last terrorism-related activity, other available evidence, and shortcomings in the programme could all be considered. The identified deficiencies did not invalidate the overall assessment.

The judgment describes a combined statutory review under section 9 and appeal under section 16 of the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011. An earlier judgment in the same proceedings is cited as [2022] EWHC 825 (Admin).