A v V

In applications under Schedule 1 of the Children Act 1989, the court must make proper financial provision for the child by applying the statutory framework and taking account of the child’s needs, the parents’ resources and the circumstances of the case. An agreement made by parents before a child was conceived cannot fetter the court’s jurisdiction or determine the child’s entitlement. In affluent or very wealthy cases, periodical payments may be assessed broadly. Provision should meet reasonable needs without creating an inappropriate fund for savings. The court may order housing through a trust where that structure best protects the child and carer and reduces damaging parental contact. A restriction under section 91(14) may be appropriate where persistent and oppressive litigation is harmful to the child.

The applicant and respondent were the parents of a child born in 2014. Following a prolonged and highly acrimonious history of litigation in England, Singapore and elsewhere, the mother applied under Schedule 1 of the Children Act 1989 for financial provision for herself as carer and for the child. The issues included housing, lump sums, periodical payments, education and vehicle costs, the effect of a pre-conception agreement, the structure of any housing provision, and whether further applications should be restricted under section 91(14). The father appeared in person at the final hearing. The court determined the substantive financial provision and the appropriate safeguards against further litigation.

1. The application under Schedule 1 of the Children Act 1989 was granted. The court ordered the father to provide a property for the mother and child during the child’s minority, extended to one year after full-time tertiary education or the child’s twenty-first birthday if he did not enter tertiary education. The property was to be purchased through a trust, with a price of up to £4 million plus stamp duty and conveyancing costs.
2. The 2007 agreement could not determine the child’s financial provision. It had been made by the parents before the child was conceived, in materially different circumstances, and the child was not a party. An agreement could not oust the court’s jurisdiction to make proper provision for a child.
3. Following Re P (Financial Provision) [2003] 2 FLR 865, the court adopted a broad-brush approach to periodical payments in an affluent or very wealthy Schedule 1 case. The carer should not suffer financial anxiety or parsimony when the other parent could live lavishly, but provision should not ordinarily fund savings, pensions or endowments. The father was ordered to pay £125,000 per annum, subject to annual CPI variation.
4. The court rejected a tenancy because the father’s role as landlord would preserve an unacceptable sense of power over the mother. A trust with professional trustees was preferable and should minimise parental interaction and opportunities for further dispute. The father was also ordered to fund refurbishment, furniture, a car, trust expenses, school fees and tertiary education costs.
5. The court refused an additional sum representing costs not awarded by the earlier district judge, but ordered payment of approximately £92,000 representing the shortfall under an earlier order and the mother’s costs in the present proceedings.
6. Applying the statutory test, the court made a five-year order under section 91(14), preventing either party from applying in relation to Schedule 1 or child finance without permission. The order was justified by the father’s persistent, oppressive and disproportionate litigation and the need to protect the child from further conflict. The father remained entitled to seek variation if circumstances materially changed.