Shamsul Islam & Anor, R (on the application of) v The London Borough of Haringey

A public-law decision may be unlawful where its reasoning contains a demonstrable factual, logical or methodological flaw. A mistake of fact must ordinarily concern an existing fact, be objectively verifiable, be one for which the claimant is not responsible, and have materially influenced the decision.

Housing authorities may obtain specialist medical advice and are not required to prefer a treating doctor’s evidence over that of a consultant psychiatrist. They must, however, give rational reasons when departing from significant medical evidence. A decision-maker need not address every disagreement with a doctor or give reasons for its reasons.

The claimants sought judicial review of the London Borough of Haringey’s decision maintaining Mr Islam in Band B rather than placing him in Band A under the authority’s housing allocation scheme. The relevant criterion required both severe mental health problems and an inability, or likely inability, to cope with temporary accommodation.

The parties agreed that the first limb was satisfied. The dispute concerned the second limb and three alleged flaws: the treatment of a GP’s evidence, reliance on a psychiatric adviser who had not examined Mr Islam, and failure to consider the possibility that the temporary accommodation could be ended. The central issue was whether the authority’s reasoning was legally irrational or otherwise flawed.

1. Claim dismissed. The authority’s decision-making process contained no demonstrable flaw requiring judicial review relief.
2. The applicable approach to flawed reasoning was stated in R (Law Society) v Lord Chancellor [2018] EWHC 2094 (Admin). A factual-error challenge requires the four criteria identified in E v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] Q.B. 1044.
3. The alleged mistake about constant rehousing originated in the GP’s earlier letters, was not corrected in the later letter, and was not objectively shown to represent the GP’s understanding when the later letter was written. The claimants and their advisers had continued to rely on the earlier material. The first and third E criteria were therefore not met. The authority was entitled to consider the medical evidence in its full factual context.
4. The authority was entitled to give greater prominence to the report of Dr Walters, the consultant psychiatrist who provided the fullest and most authoritative assessment, than to the GP’s less certain opinion. The use of NowMedical’s document-based advice was lawful. The authority was seeking an additional medically qualified opinion on the decision, not an independent diagnosis, and the agreed nature of Mr Islam’s severe mental health problems reduced the significance of the absence of an examination.
5. The authority was not required to mention every disagreement with medical evidence or to give reasons for its reasons. The principles in Guiste v Lambeth LBC [2019] EWCA Civ 1758 and Shala v Birmingham CC [2007] EWCA Civ 624 did not require a different result on these facts.
6. There was no failure to consider a material matter concerning the lease break clause. The claimants had not advanced that matter to the authority. The authority was entitled to rely on the established stability of the accommodation and its anticipated continuation. The court did not need to determine the alternative substantial-difference issue under section 31(2A) of the Senior Courts Act 1981.

First-instance judicial review claim. Permission was initially refused on paper and granted after renewal on 26 January 2023. The claim was dismissed by the Administrative Court.