R (on the application of) MUSFER JABBAR v THE SHEFFIELD CROWN COURT

Where bail is granted solely because an application to extend a custody time limit has been refused, the release is granted in consequence of the expiry of the custody time limit for the purposes of section 22(5)(b) of the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985. The custody time limit therefore comes to an end on release. If bail is granted for another reason, the custody time limit clock is paused and restarts if the defendant is later remanded in custody for the original offence. The timing provisions in the Prosecution of Offences (Custody Time Limits) Regulations 1987 do not alter the construction of the primary legislation.

The claimant was charged with serious offences and remanded in custody subject to a 182-day custody time limit. The Crown Court refused the prosecution’s application to extend the limit because the prosecution had not acted with all due diligence and expedition. The claimant was released on conditional bail before the limit expired.

After alleged breaches of bail and a failure to attend court, he was remanded in custody again. The Recorder of Sheffield held that the custody time limit regime no longer applied because the claimant had been released in consequence of the expiry of a custody time limit. The claimant sought judicial review, challenging that interpretation of section 22(5)(b) of the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985.

1. Application refused. The court refused permission to apply for judicial review and upheld the Recorder’s decision that the claimant was lawfully detained.
2. The purpose of the custody time limit regime is to ensure that unconvicted defendants are held in custody awaiting trial for periods that are as short as reasonably and practically possible. Release before the precise expiry date may still be release in consequence of the expiry of the custody time limit where the sole reason for release is that an extension has been refused or has not been sought.
3. Section 22(5)(b) of the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985 applied. The application before HHJ Dixon was an application to extend the custody time limit. It was refused, and bail was granted expressly because of that refusal. There was no separate ordinary bail application or independent discretionary decision on bail.
4. The fact that release occurred 20 days before the nominal expiry date, and did not follow the procedure in Regulation 6(6) of the Prosecution of Offences (Custody Time Limits) Regulations 1987, did not change the statutory consequence. The Regulations are subordinate to the Act. Early release provided the benefit of the custody time limit by avoiding unnecessary detention.
5. Where bail is granted for a reason other than the consequence of expiry of a custody time limit, the clock is paused on release and restarts if the defendant is later remanded in custody for the original offence. Parliament had not enacted provisions equivalent to sections 22(6) and 22(6A) for custody time limits, so no analogous statutory approach applied.
6. The claimant was not exposed to unlimited detention without safeguards. He could apply for bail if circumstances changed, and the court retained an imperative to list the trial with appropriate celerity.

• Sheffield Crown Court: The Recorder refused to order the claimant’s release, holding that the custody time limit regime ceased to apply when bail was granted in consequence of the refusal to extend the limit.
• High Court (Administrative Court): The court upheld that conclusion and refused permission to apply for judicial review.