HFAG LIMITED (R on the application of) v BUCKINGHAMSHIRE COUNCIL

In planning judicial review, the court reviews legality, not the merits of the planning judgment. Whether a planning obligation satisfies regulation 122 of the Community Infrastructure Levy Regulations 2010 is ordinarily a matter for the decision-maker’s planning judgment, subject to conventional public law review.

An officer’s report must be read fairly and benevolently. It need not address every consideration or be exhaustive. Intervention is justified only where the advice materially misleads the committee on an issue which could have affected its decision. A local planning authority may reject healthcare contributions where the evidence does not establish that they are necessary, directly related, and fairly and reasonably related in scale and kind to the development.

HFAG Limited sought judicial review of Buckinghamshire Council’s decision of 24 June 2021 to grant outline planning permission for a mixed-use sustainable urban extension at Weston Turville.

The challenge concerned whether the Council lawfully decided that the development’s healthcare mitigation could be limited to an on-site doctor’s surgery secured through a section 106 agreement. The claimant alleged failures to consider healthcare representations, reliance on irrelevant or misleading advice, inadequate reasons, irrationality, and unlawful refusal to defer the decision.

The claim concerned requests by the primary-care commissioning body for funding towards a larger strategic facility and by the hospital trust for contributions towards revenue and capital healthcare costs.

1. The claim was dismissed. Grounds 1 to 5 failed on their merits. Permission was refused on Ground 6 because it was unarguable.
2. The Council was entitled to conclude, as an exercise of planning judgment, that the proposed 600 square metre health centre and temporary healthcare provision adequately addressed the needs generated by the development. It was not required to fund a larger facility serving several developments or the wider existing population. The proposed section 106 obligation satisfied the relevant decision-making framework in principle, and the claimant identified no public law error.
3. The Council had considered the primary-care and hospital trust representations. It was entitled to find that the evidence supporting the requested contributions was insufficiently developed, lacked adequate demonstration of direct impact and deliverability, and had not been subject to viability testing. The difference between the revenue and capital calculations reinforced the need for a robust methodology.
4. The erroneous statement that revenue costs fell outside regulation 122 of the Community Infrastructure Levy Regulations 2010 was corrected in the corrigendum report. Members were not materially misled. The Council’s reasons, read across the officer’s report, corrigendum, oral advice and delegated determination report, were adequate and intelligible.
5. The lateness of the revised contribution requests was a relevant consideration because it prevented full assessment before the meeting. Members were entitled to balance the public interest in further investigation against delay and prejudice to housing supply and the transport strategy.
6. An officer incorrectly suggested that the section 106 agreement itself provided for future discussions about a larger health centre. That error was not materially misleading because the possibility of such discussions was not likely to affect the decision then required. The officer’s description of the marketing process as involving the primary-care commissioning body was, in context, accurate.