TARIAN HAFREN SEVERN SHIELD CYF (R on the application of) v MARINE MANAGEMENT ORGANISATION

The power to vary a marine licence may enlarge its scope and may authorise an activity not previously specified, provided the proposed change remains properly characterised as a variation of the existing licence. The assessment depends on the original licence, its conditions and previous variations, the authorised activities, the proposed addition, and the project or other statutory authorisations forming the relevant context.

Under section 72(3)(d) of the Marine and Coastal Access Act 2009, the licensing authority has a broad discretion. The proposal and its merits may constitute a relevant reason. The provision does not impose a separate duty to state reasons.

Environmental and water-framework duties require lawful consideration of relevant risks, but do not require an activity to improve an already-substandard water body.

The claimant sought judicial review of the Marine Management Organisation’s decision to vary a marine licence for the Hinkley Point C project. The variation authorised the disposal at Portishead of material arising from capital and maintenance dredging.

The claim originally advanced several grounds. At the hearing, the claimant pursued challenges based on the scope of the statutory power to vary a licence, the existence and identification of a relevant reason, the waste hierarchy, and the Water Framework Directive. A challenge concerning the Habitats Regulations was abandoned.

The central questions were whether disposal was a new activity requiring a fresh licence, whether the MMO lawfully exercised section 72(3)(d), and whether it complied with the applicable environmental and water-quality requirements.

1. Ground 1 rejected. Section 72 of the Marine and Coastal Access Act 2009 is not confined to reductions or minor alterations. A variation may widen the geographical scope of an activity, extend works, or add an activity not previously authorised, provided the change remains within the legal concept of varying the licence.
2. The question whether a proposal goes beyond variation is fact-sensitive. Relevant matters include the terms of the original licence and its conditions, previous variations, the nature and extent of the authorised activities, the nature and extent of the proposed addition, the project to which the licence relates, and other relevant statutory authorisations. The court did not attempt to define the outermost limit of the power.
3. On the facts, disposal of dredged material was ancillary and incidental to previously authorised dredging and construction works. The DCO and earlier licence conditions required material dredged from the Severn Estuary to remain within the SAC. The sixth variation changed the disposal location between designated sites within the estuary and therefore fell well within section 72.
4. Ground 2 rejected. Section 72(3)(d), read in context, confers a broad discretion. The proposal made by a licensee, together with the MMO’s assessment of its merits, may constitute a relevant reason. No rigid two-stage process was required, and section 72 did not impose a duty to give reasons. The MMO’s gateway assessment and substantive environmental assessment showed that it considered the proposal lawfully.
5. Ground 4 rejected. Returning dredged material to the SAC to maintain its sediment budget fell within the waste-hierarchy category of preparing for re-use. The MMO was not required to assess lower tiers once that conclusion had been reached.
6. Ground 5 rejected. The MMO was subject to the Water Framework Directive through the Water Environment (Water Framework Directive) (England and Wales) Regulations. The proposal did not deteriorate chemical status or jeopardise attainment of good status. The legislation did not require the proposal itself to reduce existing contaminants.
7. The claim for judicial review was dismissed.

First-instance judicial review in the High Court (Planning Court). The claim challenging the MMO’s variation decision was dismissed.