Robert Hurst v Evelyn Green & Ors

Permission to reopen a judgment debt or seek annulment of bankruptcy requires more than a new factual variation on allegations previously rejected. The applicant must show material capable of demonstrating that, had there been a properly conducted judicial process, the court would have reached the opposite conclusion or, at least, refused summary judgment and ordered a trial. Repeated attempts to relitigate substantially the same allegations may constitute an abuse of process. Speculative discrepancies which do not establish fraud, deceit, undue influence or a realistic prospect of a different result do not satisfy the threshold.

The applicant sought reconsideration of an order refusing permission to make a fourth application to annul his bankruptcy. He relied on a later telephone conversation concerning the circumstances in which his late mother had entered a trust scheme and alleged that earlier evidence and a solicitor’s letter had been misleading.

The application arose in the context of an extended civil restraint order and a series of earlier judgments rejecting substantially similar allegations. The central questions were whether the new account met the threshold in Dawodu, whether it satisfied the alternative fraud-based test, and whether the proposed applications would amount to an abuse of process.

1. Permission refused. The court maintained its earlier refusal of permission to seek review of previous decisions, annulment of the bankruptcy order, rescission of an earlier order, and repayment of money. Permission to appeal was also refused.
2. Applying Dawodu, the relevant question was whether the different factual account was realistically arguable as capable of causing, or very likely causing, the original judge to reach the opposite conclusion, namely that undue influence was proved and no debt was due. The court also considered the less demanding alternative of whether the account would have caused the original judge to refuse summary judgment and send the undue-influence claim to trial.
3. The applicant’s allegations concerning the attendance of his mother and accountant at meetings, the solicitor’s letter, and the absence of a responding witness statement did not establish deceit or provide a foundation for an arguable case of undue influence. The allegations were a slight variation on matters repeatedly considered and were inconsistent with the established evidence that the applicant knew of the scheme, had been invited to participate, that the accountant was involved, and that the applicant had advised his mother.
4. The court treated the proposed fourth attempt as an abuse of process. The latest allegations were speculative, did not materially undermine the earlier judgments, and could not realistically have altered the original decision. The application was therefore totally without merit.

The judgment records earlier decisions concerning the applicant’s bankruptcy and previous applications to annul it, including judgments of Fancourt J. dated [2020] EWHC 344 (Ch) and [2021] EWHC 1767 (Ch). The present court reconsidered its order of 20 December 2021 and maintained the refusal of permission.