THE QUEEN (MARC DAN SALLY SALOMON) v WESTMINSTER MAGISTRATES’ COURT

At the permission stage of a judicial review in an extradition case, the claimant must show an arguable error of law with a realistic prospect of success. A possible defect in an arrest warrant does not necessarily make consent to extradition involuntary or require automatic discharge. The court must consider the practical consequences of the alleged defect and whether accurate advice would realistically have altered the decision to consent. Jurisdiction to revisit consent may exist where consent was legally invalid, but that issue is distinct from whether the evidence establishes material vitiation. A court may express serious reservations about a non-binding authority without finally deciding that its approach is wrong.

The claimant was arrested under an arrest warrant seeking his extradition to Belgium for alleged fraud and money laundering. He consented to extradition at Westminster Magistrates’ Court and an extradition order was made under section 46(6) of the Extradition Act 2003.

After instructing new lawyers, he sought to reopen consent, alleging that his original legal advice was inaccurate and incomplete. The District Judge declined to inquire into the advice received. The claimant sought judicial review, arguing that consent had been vitiated and that the magistrates’ court, or alternatively the High Court, had jurisdiction to revisit it. The central issue was whether the proposed challenge was arguable with a realistic prospect of success.

1. Permission refused. The claim was not arguable with a realistic prospect of success. The claimant’s alleged vitiation of consent depended on a necessary case-specific step which failed.
2. The court accepted that jurisdiction to revisit consent was at least arguable and, in principle, must exist if incorrect legal advice could vitiate consent and had in fact done so. The court could also permit amendment to challenge the original extradition order, because refusing the claim solely for identifying the wrong target would be contrary to the interests of justice.
3. The court treated the strongest alleged error as the Bob-Dogi point. The arrest warrant’s reference to an international warrant bearing the same date could indicate the absence of a separate prior domestic warrant. However, the warrant was at most ambiguous. The issue would have led to inquiry, further information, or potentially a fresh domestic warrant and arrest warrant. It would not necessarily have produced automatic discharge.
4. Correct advice therefore required advice about the practical consequences of the point. The contemporaneous attendance notes showed that the claimant had been advised that the warrant disclosed insufficient particulars, that extradition could be challenged, that further information might be sought, and that consent would result in removal within about 10 days. In light of that evidence, there was no realistic prospect of proving that fuller advice about the Bob-Dogi point would have caused him not to consent.
5. The court expressed strong reservations about Ballan, particularly its treatment of appreciation of possible grounds of objection as part of voluntariness and its suggested post-consent inquiry into the accuracy and completeness of legal advice. The court did not finally determine that issue because the claimant failed at the application stage.
6. The First Interested Party was awarded £1,200 for preparing and filing its acknowledgment of service and associated documents, payable within seven days. The court declined to include wording suggesting that an extension of time for removal would be required.

The judgment does not state a prior appellate history. It concerned judicial review of decisions made by Westminster Magistrates’ Court on 20 October and 3 November 2021.