LADY CATHERINE ANNA BRUDENELL-BRUCE v THOMAS JAMES BRUDENELL-BRUCE, VISCOUNT SAVERNAKE

The court’s jurisdiction to remove a personal representative is directed to the proper and timely administration of the estate and the interests of the beneficiaries as a whole. Proof of wrongdoing is unnecessary, although material wrongdoing or fault strongly supports removal. The court must balance the testator’s wishes, the beneficiaries’ interests, the difficulty of completing the administration, the possibility of managing conflicts, and the cost of replacement.

The assessment is forward-looking, but past conduct informs whether the personal representative can administer the estate impartially and expediently. A conflict arising from the appointment is not necessarily sufficient. An external conflict, including an intention to purchase estate property or to recover personal debts through the administration, may justify replacement where it cannot be managed through a fair and transparent process.

The claimant and defendant were the two children and co-executors of their late mother’s estate. The principal estate asset was a house which remained unrealised almost eight years after probate. The defendant occupied the property and was also a beneficiary. He sought to resolve alleged personal and estate-related debts owed by the claimant before completing the administration.

The claimant issued a Part 8 claim under section 50 of the Administration of Estates Act 1925 seeking the defendant’s removal and the appointment of a professional administrator. The defendant argued that the property could be realised through court directions while he remained executor. The central issue was whether replacement was in the beneficiaries’ best interests.

1. Applicable principles. The court applied the principles summarised in Harris and Others v Earwicker and Others [2015] EWHC 1915 (Ch). Removal does not require wrongdoing. The governing question is whether the estate is being, or can be, properly administered and whether replacement is in the beneficiaries’ interests as a whole. Relevant considerations include material fault, the testator’s wishes, the beneficiaries’ wishes, difficulty or impossibility in completing the administration, breakdown of relations, and the additional cost of replacement.
2. The inquiry is forward-looking, but past conduct informs the assessment. A conflict caused by the testator’s choice of executor is not itself sufficient. An external conflict may be manageable only if the process is transparent and fair. The court must undertake a holistic balancing exercise directed to completing the administration promptly and at proportionate cost.
3. The defendant’s conduct went beyond a proper reconciliation of estate liabilities. He linked realisation of the property to resolution of personal loans, advanced an exaggerated account including historic school fees, raised the chattels issue as a delaying tactic, and proposed a division which improperly gave him the benefit of non-existent sale expenses. These matters showed that he was preferring his interests as beneficiary over his duties as executor.
4. The defendant’s wish to purchase the property created further external conflicts, including the interaction with the pre-emption right and his interests under the Savernake trusts. The valuations had not been obtained on joint instructions, and the court was not satisfied that directions would secure a fair process.
5. The administration had not been carried out properly, the parties’ relationship had broken down, and the court was not satisfied that the position could be resolved with the defendant remaining in office. The claimant’s wishes and the testator’s appointment of both children as executors were outweighed by the risk to the beneficiaries and the proportionate cost of professional replacement.
6. The defendant was removed as executor. Mr Westbrook was appointed as professional administrator, subject to the terms of the order. The claimant succeeded on the removal claim and an order for costs was made in principle; costs were not reserved for the separate account claim.

First-instance decision. The judgment records earlier directions proceedings concerning the separation of the removal claim from the account claim, but no appellate decision.