HULL UNIVERSITY TEACHING HOSPITALS NHS TRUST v NATASHA LOUISE COLLEY

Contempt of court based on false statements verified by statements of truth requires proof to the criminal standard that the statement was false, materially interfered, or was likely materially to interfere, with the course of justice, and was made without an honest belief in its truth.

Exaggeration of a personal-injury claim may amount to contempt where the maker knowingly presents a materially false picture of the claimant’s disability. Variability in symptoms or the existence of good and bad days does not prevent a finding of dishonesty where the statements omit a materially different level of functioning. Such contempt is ordinarily sufficiently serious to justify imprisonment, although a sentence may exceptionally be suspended after assessment of culpability, harm and personal mitigation.

The Applicant sought the committal of the Respondent for contempt of court. The allegations concerned statements made in support of her daughter’s clinical-negligence claim, in which the Respondent acted as litigation friend while her daughter was a minor.

The Applicant alleged that the Respondent knowingly exaggerated her daughter’s mobility limitations and reliance on a wheelchair. The underlying claim was discontinued before the alleged fundamental-dishonesty issue was determined. The central questions were whether specified statements were false, whether the Respondent knew they were false, and whether they materially interfered, or would have materially interfered, with the administration of justice.

1. Contempt established in relation to two statements. The court applied the criminal standard. It was sure that the Respondent knowingly made false statements when, in her witness statement dated 5 November 2017, she confirmed the accuracy of material parts of an occupational-therapy report stating that her daughter relied on an assistant at college, attended college in a wheelchair and had a full-time teaching assistant who pushed it. It was also sure that she knowingly made a false statement in the Schedule of Loss dated 16 March 2018 that her daughter was currently reliant on a wheelchair when out of the house.
2. The evidence of college performances and teachers showed that the daughter had taken leading roles, danced and performed in physically demanding productions. That evidence was inconsistent with the picture of substantial disability advanced in the relevant documents. The court rejected the explanation that the difference was attributable to good days, increased Tramadol use or occasional wheelchair use. The statements were knowingly made to increase the value of the clinical-negligence claim and materially interfered, or would if persisted in have interfered, with the course of justice.
3. The court was not sure that the other alleged statements were knowingly false. It could not exclude the possibility that later surveillance footage showed good days or increased painkiller use. The earlier 2013 statement was also not proved false to the criminal standard because the evidence relating to that period was limited.
4. For penalty, the court applied the principles summarised in National Highways Ltd v Heyatawin and others [2021] EWHC 3078 (QB) and the guidance in Liverpool Victoria Insurance Co Ltd v Khan [2019] 1 WLR 3833. False statements of this kind are inherently serious because they undermine the administration of justice. Culpability and harm were assessed, including the potential increase in the claim’s value, the Respondent’s involvement of her daughter and the absence of an admission or apology.
5. A fine was insufficient and custody was unavoidable in principle. The shortest commensurate sentence was six months’ imprisonment. Having regard to the Respondent’s personal circumstances, mental-health difficulties, previous good character, family responsibilities and realistic prospect of rehabilitation, the sentence was suspended for two years on condition that she committed no further contempt of court.

First-instance committal application determined by the High Court (Queen’s Bench Division). No appellate history was stated in the judgment.