HERONSLEA (BUSHEY 4) LIMITED (R on the application of) v SECRETARY OF STATE FOR HOUSING, COMMUNITIES AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT

Under the Community Infrastructure Levy regime, liability arises when chargeable development commences. Where no commencement notice is submitted, the development may lose social housing relief under regulation 51(7)(a), even if relief was previously granted. Regulation 53 addresses later disqualifying events and does not replace regulation 51(7)(a).

The date payment is due is fixed by regulations 70 and 71, not by the liability or demand notice. Where a deemed commencement date is determined, the full amount is due on that date. Late-payment periods therefore run from the deemed commencement date. A demand notice may remain legally effective despite an inaccurate reason unless successfully challenged.

The claimant sought judicial review of an Inspector’s dismissal of its appeal against Community Infrastructure Levy surcharges. The development had received social housing relief, but the claimant commenced works without submitting a commencement notice. The collecting authority determined a deemed commencement date, withdrew the relief under regulation 51(7)(a), and imposed surcharges for failure to submit the notice and late payment.

The claimant challenged the interpretation of regulation 51(7)(a), arguing that relief could only be withdrawn for a later disqualifying event under regulation 53. It also argued that payment was not due until service of a valid demand notice. The central issues were the effect of the missed commencement notice and the date on which payment became due.

1. Ground 1 dismissed. Regulation 51(7)(a) applies where a commencement notice is not submitted before chargeable development commences, including where social housing relief has already been granted. The wording contains no limitation confining it to the period before the relief decision.

2. The claimant’s interpretation would make regulation 51(7)(a) largely superfluous because regulation 51(4) already addresses commencement before notification of the relief decision. The structure of regulation 51 supports application of regulation 51(7)(a) after relief has been granted.

3. Regulation 51(6) merely enables the claimant to benefit from relief granted to the chargeable development. It does not create a personal entitlement immune from the conditions in regulation 51(7). Regulation 53 has a different function: it creates an additional liability following a later disqualifying event affecting qualifying dwellings or communal development.

4. The interpretation was supported by the parallel statutory schemes for other exemptions and reliefs, the legislative background, and the purpose of the CIL Regulations, namely to provide certainty about when liability arises and to enable accurate calculation of the clawback period.

5. Ground 2 dismissed. Liability arose on commencement under regulation 31(3). Because no commencement notice was submitted and a deemed commencement date was determined, regulation 71(2) made the full CIL amount due on that date. Regulation 69(2)(e) required the demand notice to state the due date but did not create it.

6. The inaccurate reference in the first demand notice to a disqualifying event was potentially misleading, but the notice remained valid unless challenged by statutory appeal or judicial review. It was not challenged before being superseded by the revised notice.

7. The Inspector’s reference to regulation 70 rather than regulation 71(2) was an inadvertent slip which did not affect the substance of his reasoning. The claim for judicial review was dismissed.