SOCIAL WORK ENGLAND v CLAIRE SHAW

An interim suspension order may be extended where continuation is necessary for the protection of the public and in the public interest. The court assesses necessity separately for the continuation, the type of interim order, and the proposed duration. Relevant considerations include the gravity of the allegations, the evidence, the risk of harm, reasons for delay, and prejudice to the registrant. The court does not determine primary facts or the merits of unproven allegations, except where the case plainly has little merit. An interim order is a holding measure, not punishment, and need not await completion of the investigation. Its continuation may remain necessary despite personal prejudice, particularly where substantive proceedings are imminent and a lesser order would not adequately protect the public.

Social Work England applied under paragraph 14(2) and (3) of Schedule 2 to the Social Workers Regulations 2018 to extend for six months an interim suspension order imposed on Claire Shaw by an Adjudicators’ Panel on 6 May 2021. The order was due to expire on 5 May 2022.

The allegations concerned safeguarding, unauthorised access to confidential records, disclosure of confidential information, non-disclosure of earlier misconduct proceedings, and alleged dishonesty. Ms Shaw opposed the extension through written representations, relying on delay, stress, and her intention to leave the register. The central issue was whether continuation of the interim suspension order until 4 November 2022 was necessary and proportionate.

1. The application was granted. The interim suspension order was extended for six months, until 4 November 2022.
2. Applying the approach in General Medical Council v Hiew [2007] EWCA Civ 369, the court held that Social Work England had to establish necessity for the continuation of an interim order, for an interim suspension order rather than a lesser order, and for the duration sought. Relevant factors included the seriousness of the allegations, the nature of the evidence, the risk of harm, reasons for the time taken, and prejudice to the respondent.
3. The court did not determine primary facts or the underlying merits. The allegations remained unproven and would be determined at the substantive hearing, unless the case could clearly be seen to have little merit.
4. An interim suspension order was a holding measure for public protection, not punishment. It could properly continue before completion of the investigation and could be extended under the statutory scheme. The proceedings could not be avoided by unilateral removal from the register while an open fitness-to-practise case remained pending.
5. The allegations raised serious concerns about probity, trustworthiness, safeguarding, confidentiality, and professional conduct. The evidence was sufficiently substantial to justify continuation, and an interim conditions order would not adequately protect the public. The prejudice caused by continuation was outweighed by the public-interest need for protection. The proposed duration provided necessary and proportionate headroom for the imminent substantive hearing and contingencies.