Emlyn Quashie (Administratrix Pendente Lite of the Estate of the Deceased Beresford Solomon) v Ayana Solomon (Trinidad and Tobago)

An appellate court will rarely interfere with concurrent findings of primary fact. The exception for mixed questions involving objective evaluation does not permit a fresh assessment of whether a promise was made. Statutory limitation periods for actions to recover land do not, without more, invalidate voluntary compliance with an extant court order where no action has been brought to enforce the order or recover the land. A consent order must be construed in context. Where its purpose was to secure a child’s beneficial share, a court-nominated conveyancer may convey that share directly to the child.

Mr Beresford Solomon sought to set aside a deed executed by the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Judicature in 2011. The deed conveyed a half share in matrimonial property directly to his daughter, Ayana Solomon, pursuant to a 1988 consent order requiring Mr Solomon to convey the share to his former wife, Ricarda Solomon, in trust for Ayana.

The High Court dismissed Mr Solomon’s claim on 5 November 2013. The Court of Appeal of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago upheld that decision on 31 May 2019. After Mr Solomon’s death, the appeal was continued by his administratrix pendente lite. The issues before the Board concerned estoppel, statutory limitation, the proper construction of the consent order, the existence of a constructive trust, and the Registrar’s power to execute the 2011 deed.

The Board dismissed the appeal.

1. Estoppel and appellate review. The Board held that the lower courts’ concurrent findings on the estoppel claims were unimpeachable. The principle in Devi v Roy [1946] AC 508, as referred to in Betaudier v Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago [2021] UKPC 7, meant that the Board would rarely overturn concurrent findings of primary fact. The distinction in Betaudier concerned a mixed question involving objective evaluation. It did not permit a fresh assessment where the issue was whether Ricarda had made a promise, which was a question of primary fact. The Board therefore declined to interfere with the findings rejecting the alleged promise.
2. Limitation. The Board held that the limitation provisions did not invalidate the 2011 deed. The 1988 consent order remained valid and imposed a continuing obligation to convey the land. Neither Ayana’s request to the Registrar nor the Registrar’s execution of the deed constituted an action to enforce the order or recover an interest in land. Nothing in the Limitation of Certain Actions Act or the Real Property Limitation Act precluded voluntary compliance with an extant court order, however old.
3. Construction and Registrar’s powers. The consent order was construed as securing Ayana’s beneficial half share, rather than creating a sub-trust under which Ricarda would hold her own beneficial interest for Ayana. Mr Solomon accordingly held the relevant half of the legal title for Ayana. Section 24 of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act empowered the nominated Registrar to execute the conveyance in place of a person who neglected or refused to comply, with the same effect as if that person had executed it. The direct conveyance to Ayana was therefore within the Registrar’s power. The 2011 deed was valid and effective. It was unnecessary to consider further the constructive trust analysis adopted by the Court of Appeal.

• Privy Council: The Board dismissed the appeal and held that the 2011 deed was valid and effective.
• Court of Appeal of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago: On 31 May 2019, Pemberton JA, with Jamadar and Bereaux JJA agreeing, upheld the High Court’s dismissal of the claim and ordered valuation and potential sale of the property.
• High Court: Rahim J dismissed Mr Solomon’s claim on 5 November 2013.