Maureen Ngozi Obi-Ezekpazu v Avon Ground Rents Limited

A landlord cannot recover ground rent under a long residential lease unless it has given a valid notice under section 166 of the Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act 2002. Where the notice is posted, it must be addressed to the dwelling unless the tenant has given the landlord written notification of a different address for notices under that section.

A lease clause incorporating section 196 of the Law of Property Act 1925 does not, without more, amount to such a notification. Section 196 provides a general method of service at a last known address. It does not displace the specific statutory default in section 166(6). A purchaser of a reversion is not ordinarily fixed with its predecessor’s knowledge of a tenant’s address.

The appellant was the original tenant of a long lease of a flat. Her landlord acquired the reversion in 2013 and sent ground-rent demands to an address stated in the lease and Land Registry record, rather than to the dwelling.

The First-tier Tribunal (Property Chamber), by a decision of 12 April 2021, found administration charges of £420 payable for enforcement steps concerning unpaid ground rent. It also made a limited order under section 20C of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 concerning litigation costs recoverable through the service charge.

On appeal, the issues were whether knowledge of the tenant’s alternative address should be imputed to a successor landlord, and whether the lease’s incorporation of section 196 of the Law of Property Act 1925 constituted written notification of an alternative address under section 166 of the Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act 2002.

1. The appeal against the administration charges was allowed. A successor landlord is not, merely by acquiring the reversion, treated as knowing facts known to its predecessor, including a tenant’s address for service. There was no agency relationship between seller and purchaser, and no statutory rule imposing that knowledge.

2. Although the address in the Land Registry and lease could be treated as the tenant’s last known place of abode for the general service provisions in section 196 of the Law of Property Act 1925, that did not answer the separate statutory question. The general approach in Oldham MBC v Tanna [2017] 1 WLR 1970 was expressly subject to any contrary statutory requirement.

3. Section 166(6) of the Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act 2002 required a posted ground-rent demand to be addressed to the dwelling, unless the tenant had notified the landlord in writing of a different address at which she wished to receive notices under that section. Clause 9 of the lease, incorporating section 196, was insufficient. It concerned general service at a last known place of abode and did not communicate the tenant’s positive choice to receive section 166 notices at the address stated in the lease.

4. The landlord had not proved valid service of the 2013 demands. No ground rent was then payable, the tenant was not in breach of covenant, and enforcement action could not justify administration charges. The claimed £420 was therefore not payable.

5. The section 20C appeal was dismissed. The First-tier Tribunal was not exercising an ordinary costs jurisdiction. It was entitled to assess what contractual recovery through the service charge would be just and equitable, and made no error of principle in limiting the tenant’s protection to 70% of apportioned service-charge costs.

• Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber): allowed the appeal against the administration-charge determination and dismissed the appeal concerning the section 20C order.
• First-tier Tribunal (Property Chamber): decision of 12 April 2021. It found £420 in administration charges payable and limited the tenant’s section 20C protection to 70% of relevant costs.