Andrew Bennett v Birmingham Airport Limited

Part 1 compensation is confined to depreciation in the value of an interest in land caused by a prescribed physical factor arising from the use of public works. The assessment is market-based, not personal to the claimant. Subjective evidence may illuminate the change in the physical environment and its likely effect on purchasers, but it does not itself determine compensation. Technical evidence is necessary to establish a change in the prescribed factor, while valuation evidence determines the resulting diminution. Different noise metrics may be used according to what they measure; no single metric is mandatory. Compensation must exclude loss attributable to other causes and cannot include a free-standing equivalence element unsupported by the Act.

The claimant owned a bungalow near Birmingham Airport. Following a runway extension and parallel taxiway, first used on 5 February 2014, he claimed compensation under Part 1 of the Land Compensation Act 1973 for depreciation caused by increased aircraft noise. The parties agreed that the valuation date was 6 February 2015. The claimant relied on subjective evidence, noise evidence measured principally by L_Amax, and a 20% valuation reduction. The airport disputed both a compensatable change in noise and the amount of any diminution, relying principally on L_Aeq evidence and comparable sales. The central issues were whether the works caused a relevant physical change and, if so, the market diminution attributable to it.

1. The claim succeeded. Compensation was determined at £75,000.
2. Under section 1(1) of the Land Compensation Act 1973, the claimant had to establish both a demonstrable change in a prescribed physical factor caused by the use of the works and a demonstrable diminution in the market value of the property because of that change. A reduction in value following the works was insufficient if attributable to another cause.
3. The Tribunal accepted that L_Aeq showed little change, but found a significant increase in aircraft noise when measured by L_Amax, which better reflected the loud events experienced by the claimant and potentially perceived by purchasers. The Act did not require one particular noise metric. The evidence of the noise experts established the physical change; the valuation evidence addressed its effect on value.
4. The exercise was objective and market-based. The claimant’s subjective evidence was relevant because it gave a vivid account of the changed noise environment, but compensation was not personal compensation for his experience. The Tribunal rejected the proposed additional element based on equivalence. The Act contained no statutory basis for that approach, unlike rule 6 s5(6) of the Land Compensation Act 1961.
5. The comparable evidence and indices were of limited assistance. The Tribunal placed greater weight on the claimant’s direct evidence and Mr Barlow’s valuation judgement, while excluding unrelated causes of loss. It assessed a switched-off value of about £560,000 and a switched-on value of £485,000, producing a diminution of £75,000.

First-instance determination by the Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber) on a notice of reference under Part 1 of the Land Compensation Act 1973. The decision stated that an appeal lay to the Court of Appeal on a point of law with permission.