Wyldecrest Park (Management) Ltd v Tony Turner

The First-tier Tribunal’s jurisdiction under section 4 of the Mobile Homes Act 1983 is broad, but it is confined to questions arising under the Act or the pitch agreement. It does not enable the Tribunal to create contractual rights or regulate the relationship generally.

Parliament’s statutory implied terms cannot be supplemented by the implication of further terms merely because they would be reasonable. A term implied into an individual contract must be necessary for business efficacy, obvious, capable of clear expression and consistent with the express terms. Agreements for occupation of pitches on protected sites are transactional contracts, not relational contracts carrying a general duty of good faith.

The respondent occupied a pitch at a protected site under an agreement governed by the Mobile Homes Act 1983. He applied to the First-tier Tribunal for an order requiring the site owner to provide a statement of account showing sums due and payments made.

The First-tier Tribunal directed the appellant to provide an account, holding that the request arose under the agreement. The appellant appealed, arguing that neither the Act nor the agreement required statements of account, that no such term could be implied, and that there was no dispute requiring resolution under section 4.

The central issue was whether the First-tier Tribunal had jurisdiction to order production of an account in the absence of an underlying contractual or statutory obligation to provide one.

1. Appeal allowed. The First-tier Tribunal’s decision was set aside and the respondent’s application was dismissed.
2. Section 4 of the Mobile Homes Act 1983 gives the First-tier Tribunal broad jurisdiction to determine questions and entertain proceedings arising under the Act or an agreement to which it applies. The jurisdiction is nevertheless one of dispute resolution. It does not confer substantive rights or give the Tribunal carte blanche to regulate every aspect of the relationship between site owner and occupier. The earlier decision in Wyldecrest Parks (Management) Ltd v Turner (No.1) [2020] UKUT 40 (LC) was applied.
3. The statutory implied terms in Schedule 1 already regulate matters including pitch fees and supporting information. Parliament had made provision for documentary evidence concerning new pitch fees and service charges, but had not required periodic statements of account. The Tribunal could not add such a standard term to every agreement.
4. The proposed term could not be implied into this particular agreement. Although reasonable and capable of clear expression, it was neither necessary for business efficacy nor so obvious that it went without saying. The criteria in BP Refinery (Westernport) Pty Ltd v President, Councillors and Ratepayers of the Shire of Hastings (1977) 52 ALJR 20 were applied. The distinction between terms implied by law and terms implied into an individual contract, explained in Attorney General of Belize v Belize Telecom Ltd [2009] 1 WLR 1988, Geys v Société Générale [2013] 1 AC 523 and Marks and Spencer plc (Appellant) v BNP Paribas Securities Services Trust Company (Jersey) Ltd [2015] UKSC 72, was material.
5. The pitch agreement was not a relational contract. Its indefinite duration and the occupier’s investment in a mobile home were insufficient. The arrangement was transactional and did not depend on trust, collaboration, loyalty or fidelity. The relational-contract analysis discussed in Bates v Post Office Ltd [2019] EWHC 606 (QB) did not support implying the requested term.
6. Because no obligation to provide an account existed and there was no dispute about the state of the account, the application raised no question under the Act or agreement. The First-tier Tribunal therefore lacked jurisdiction. The Tribunal added that, where it is properly seised of a dispute within its jurisdiction, it may use its case-management powers, including requiring production of documents or information such as a statement of account.

• First-tier Tribunal (Property Chamber): On 21 June 2022, directed the appellant to provide the respondent with a statement of account within 28 days.
• Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber): Allowed the appeal, set aside the First-tier Tribunal’s decision and dismissed the respondent’s application.