AHGR Limited v Dr Luke Kane-Laverack & Anor

Planning permission is construed objectively by asking what a reasonable reader would understand the words to mean in the context of the permission as a whole. Because it is a public document, the scope for using extrinsic material is limited. A lease covenant referring to a “live/work” unit must be read with the relevant permission. Where the approved plan showed the whole premises as live/work space, without separate living and working areas, the phrase permitted living, working, or both. It did not require both activities. The court left the meaning of “work” for determination in an appropriate case.

AHGR, the freehold owner, brought covenant proceedings against the leaseholders of a flat described in the lease as a “live/work” unit. The County Court construed the covenant as permitting the leaseholders to live and/or work at the premises and dismissed the breach claim.

The High Court dismissed AHGR’s appeal in a judgment reported at [2022] EWHC 2025. AHGR appealed to the Court of Appeal, arguing that “live/work” required both living and working, and that “work” meant business activity. The respondents also served a notice concerning the kitchen. The central issues were the proper construction of the planning permission and lease covenant, and, if necessary, the meaning of “work”.

1. Appeal dismissed. The Court of Appeal agreed with both lower courts that, in the particular circumstances, “live/work” meant “live and/or work”.
2. Clause 2.4 of the lease had to be interpreted in the light of the planning permission. Planning permissions are construed objectively by asking what a reasonable reader would understand the words to mean in the context of the other conditions and the permission as a whole. Their public character, the ability of third parties to rely on them, and the possibility of criminal consequences for breach justify caution in admitting extrinsic material. The Court applied the principles discussed in Cherry Tree Investments v Landmain [2012] EWCA Civ 736; [2013] Ch 305, Trump International Golf v The Scottish Ministers [2015] UKSC 74; [2016] 1 WLR 85, UBB Waste Essex v Essex County Council [2019] EWHC 1924 (Admin) and Hillside Parks Ltd v Snowdonia National Parks Authority [2022] UKSC 30; [2022] 1 WLR 5077.
3. The phrase “live/work” was linguistically ambiguous. The approved plan shaded the whole premises as “work/live” space and imposed no subdivision into separate living and working areas. That structure left the choice of where to live and work to the leaseholder. If lawful use required both living and working, clear and unambiguous language would have been expected. The planning permission therefore permitted use for living only, working only, or both, and the same meaning applied to the lease covenant.
4. The SPG, earlier plan 304D and planning officer’s deferral report were neither referred to nor incorporated into the permission and were not used in its construction. If considered, however, they supported the same conclusion: the SPG contemplated delineated workspace and specific conditions which were absent from the permission, while the later plan contrasted with the earlier divided plan.
5. The Court did not need to consider subsequent use, the kitchen’s location or the meaning of “work”. It left the latter question for an appropriate case, observing that its answer might depend on whether B1 use had been specified for any part of the premises.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): appeal dismissed. The Court held that “live/work” meant “live and/or work” in the particular planning permission and lease.
• High Court, Chancery Division: Meade J dismissed AHGR’s appeal from the County Court in the judgment reported at [2022] EWHC 2025.
• Central London County Court: HHJ Johns KC construed the covenant as permitting the leaseholders to live and/or work at the premises and dismissed the breach claim.