R v Amos Wilsher

Where a circumstantial case contains mutually corroborative evidence of association, movements, communications, forensic links and other conduct, its cumulative probative force may properly be left to the jury. A murder count may be left to the jury where the victim’s visible frailty, the brutality and persistence of the violence, and the circumstances of the attack are capable of proving an intention to cause really serious injury.

A trial judge may admit highly similar bad-character evidence and direct cross-admissibility between strikingly similar counts where the evidential and discretionary decisions are reasonable. The appellate court will not intervene merely because dissimilarities can be identified.

The applicant was convicted of conspiracy to rob, two murders and wounding with intent following attacks on elderly householders in 2017 and 2020. The prosecution relied on, among other matters, forensic evidence, vehicle evidence, cell-site and electronic-tag evidence, and evidence of the applicant’s association with relevant vehicles.

The trial judge rejected submissions of no case to answer and admitted evidence of a 2020 aggravated-burglary conviction. The applicant renewed, after refusal by the single judge, his application for leave to appeal against conviction. He challenged the sufficiency of the circumstantial evidence, the decision to leave murder to the jury in relation to one victim, and the admission and cross-admissibility of bad-character evidence.

1. The renewed application for leave to appeal against conviction was refused. The proposed grounds were unarguable.

2. The circumstantial evidence on the 2017 counts was sufficient to leave to the jury. The co-accused’s telephone was regularly associated with the area of 2 Vicar Lane, where the applicant was subject to electronic-tag monitoring. On the relevant dates there were striking correlations between the applicant’s departures from and returns to that address and the telephone’s network activity. That evidence was reinforced by DNA, vehicle, ANPR and purchaser-identification evidence. Taken cumulatively, the matters were a remarkable series of coincidences with substantial probative value.

3. The trial judge was entitled to leave murder to the jury in relation to Mrs Kaye. She was visibly old and frail. Her account and injuries demonstrated a brutal and persistent attack. A jury could conclude that the assailant appreciated that violence of that kind could cause grievous bodily harm and intended really serious injury.

4. There was no error of law in admitting the highly similar 2020 conviction as bad-character evidence. Identified dissimilarities did not make the ruling unreasonable. The judge’s exercise of discretion under Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 section 78 was reasonable. Nor was the judge wrong to direct that evidence of the strikingly similar attacks could be cross-admissible between the counts.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): the applicant renewed his application for leave to appeal against conviction after refusal by the single judge. The renewed application was refused.
• Crown Court: on 21 February 2022 the applicant was convicted of conspiracy to rob, two murders and wounding with intent. On 25 March 2022 he received life sentences with a minimum term of 38 years.