R v Jason Grainger

When fixing the minimum term for a discretionary life sentence, section 82 A of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 required the court to take account of the credit for remand custody that section 240ZA of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 would have produced for a determinate sentence. It did not impose an automatic requirement to credit every day spent on remand.

Nevertheless, absent a compelling reason to the contrary, the appropriate course will generally be to reduce the minimum term by the precise period of relevant remand custody. The court should identify that reduction transparently.

The appellant and a co-accused were convicted in 2018 of causing grievous bodily harm with intent and false imprisonment. Each received life imprisonment. The appellant’s minimum term was ten years.

An earlier appeal reduced his minimum term to eight years: [2019] EWCA Crim 2507. Neither the sentencing court nor the earlier appeal had accounted for the appellant’s 199 days on remand, as required by the statutory sentencing exercise. After the Criminal Cases Review Commission referred the case under section 9 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1995, the issue was whether the minimum term should be reduced to reflect that period.

1. Appeal allowed to a limited extent. The life sentence remained in force, but the minimum term of eight years was quashed and replaced with a minimum term of seven years and 166 days.

2. Section 82 A of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 required the court fixing the minimum term for a life sentence to consider the effect which section 240ZA of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 would have had on a determinate sentence. Section 240ZA(3) would have given automatic credit for relevant remand custody on such a sentence. The statutory exercise retained a discretion as to how that effect should be reflected in the minimum term.

3. The court adopted the guidance given in Trendell's appeal, [2022] EWCA Crim 267. Although precise credit was not mandatory, the ordinary and transparent course was to deduct the exact remand period unless a compelling reason justified a different result.

4. There was no material distinction between the appellant and Trendell, and no reason to depart from that usual approach. The sentencing judge should therefore have deducted the appellant’s 199 days of remand custody from the minimum term otherwise appropriate.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): On a reference by the Criminal Cases Review Commission, allowed the appeal to the limited extent of reducing the minimum term by 199 days.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): An earlier appeal reduced the minimum term from ten years to eight years: [2019] EWCA Crim 2507.

• Crown Court at Maidstone: In 2018 imposed life imprisonment with a minimum term of ten years.