R v Syed Minhaz Ahmed

A sentencing court must follow the relevant guideline in force when sentence is imposed, unless departure would be contrary to the interests of justice under Sentencing Code 2020. A sentencing hearing having been listed before a new guideline took effect, but adjourned until afterwards, does not itself justify applying the superseded guideline or create a legitimate expectation of sentence under it.

In determining whether a sentence is unduly lenient, the question remains whether it falls outside the range reasonably open to the sentencing judge after considering all relevant factors.

The offender was convicted at the Crown Court at Snaresbrook of causing death by dangerous driving after driving at greatly excessive speed on a 30 mph road and colliding with a cyclist. He left the scene and did not attend a police station until the following afternoon.

On 4 August 2023, the judge imposed four years’ imprisonment and a six-year driving disqualification. Although a new sentencing guideline had taken effect on 1 July 2023, the judge applied the superseded 2008 guideline because sentence had originally been expected to occur earlier.

On a reference by the Solicitor General under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, the court considered whether that approach was lawful and whether the resulting sentence was unduly lenient.

1. The court granted leave for the Solicitor General’s reference, held that the four-year sentence was unduly lenient, quashed it and substituted eight years’ imprisonment. The discretionary driving disqualification remained four years, but its extension period increased to four years. The total disqualification was therefore eight years.

2. By section 59(1) of the Sentencing Code 2020, the judge had to follow the sentencing guideline relevant when sentence was imposed unless departure was contrary to the interests of justice. The applicable guideline was the Sentencing Council guideline effective from 1 July 2023. It was wrong in principle to disregard it altogether and instead apply a superseded guideline.

3. An adjournment from an anticipated pre-guideline sentencing date did not make application of the new guideline contrary to the interests of justice. Nor did it give the offender a legitimate expectation of sentence under the earlier guideline. The court applied by analogy the principles in Patel & Ors [2021] EWCA Crim 231: an expectation inconsistent with the governing legal framework cannot be legitimate.

4. Disagreement with the Sentencing Council’s framework was not a proper basis for declining to apply it. The court adopted the approach explained in Healey & Ors [2012] EWCA Crim 1005, that judges must apply the law and applicable guidelines even if they would prefer a different rule.

5. On the current guideline, the deliberate disregard of road rules and the speed greatly exceeding the limit were two Culpability A factors. They arose from the same excessive-speed behaviour, so the case could properly be placed at the bottom of the eight-to-sixteen-year category range. The cyclist’s vulnerability and the offender’s failure to stop aggravated the offence; good character, a good driving record, some remorse and the effect of custody mitigated it. Even allowing for mitigation, the appropriate sentence could not be less than eight years.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division). On the Solicitor General’s reference under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, the court held the sentence unduly lenient, quashed it and imposed eight years’ imprisonment.
• Crown Court at Snaresbrook. The offender was convicted on 24 March 2023 of causing death by dangerous driving and sentenced on 4 August 2023 to four years’ imprisonment with a six-year driving disqualification.