R v Joshua Kerr

In an appeal against sentence, the court asks whether the sentence was wrong in principle or manifestly excessive. On a renewed application for leave, the proposed grounds must be reasonably arguable.

Youth and lack of maturity require an individual assessment. Reaching 18 does not create automatic adult maturity. The adequacy of mitigation must be assessed in the overall sentencing exercise, including justified aggravating uplift, rather than by isolating the size of a particular discount. A consecutive life sentence may be accompanied by a corresponding reduction in its minimum term where that produces the same practical result as an immediate sentence.

The applicant was convicted at the Central Criminal Court of the murder of a 16-year-old boy. He had chased the victim while armed with a large knife and inflicted a fatal neck wound. The sentencing judge imposed custody for life with a minimum term of 24 years, less time on remand. The life sentence was consecutive to a sentence which the applicant was serving for an offence under section 18 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861.

Following refusal by a single judge, the applicant renewed his application for leave to appeal against sentence. He challenged the treatment of his age and maturity, the finding that he intended to kill, the consecutive order, and the resulting minimum term. The central issue was whether those grounds disclosed an arguably wrong-in-principle or manifestly excessive sentence.

1. The renewed application for leave to appeal was refused. None of the four grounds was reasonably arguable. The applicable appellate question was whether the sentence was wrong in principle or manifestly excessive.

2. The judge was entitled to find that the applicant intended to kill. She had presided over the four-week trial and was particularly well placed to make that finding. The applicant pursued a fleeing victim and stabbed him forcefully in the neck with a large knife. There was no basis for appellate interference.

3. The sentencing judge had correctly approached youth and maturity as matters requiring individual assessment. She took account of the applicant’s age, psychological difficulties, background in care, possible personality disorder, fatherhood and future potential. The minimum-term reduction could not be assessed in isolation. It had to be considered with the aggravating features, which included the applicant’s violent and knife-related antecedents, the group pursuit, the public setting, and his being on bail for a violent offence.

4. Schedule 21 to the Sentencing Code supplied a 25-year starting point because the applicant, aged 18, had brought a knife to the scene. The judge’s overall calculation, leading to a 25-year term and then a one-year reduction because the life sentence was consecutive, was neither manifestly excessive nor wrong in principle.

5. The consecutive order was proper. The one-year reduction reflected the approximately one year remaining on the earlier custodial sentence. It therefore produced the same practical outcome as an immediate life sentence with no corresponding reduction.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): Refused the renewed application for leave to appeal against the minimum term after a single judge had refused leave.
• Central Criminal Court: On 1 April 2022 the applicant was convicted of murder. On 7 April 2022 he was sentenced to custody for life with a 24-year minimum term, less time on remand.