R v George Ward

Where a court has granted bail, the court itself should initiate proceedings for failure to surrender. If the accused admits the offence and the facts are undisputed, a prosecutor need not be appointed before the court proceeds to sentence. The position differs where guilt or reasonable cause is contested, when prosecutorial assistance is ordinarily necessary to avoid the judge entering the arena. The seriousness of a Bail Act failure-to-surrender offence is for the sentencing judge to assess in the circumstances. The distinction between sections 6(1) and 6(2) does not make one offence inherently more serious.

The appellant was required to surrender at Chelmsford Crown Court on 5 September 2022 in proceedings concerning an alleged breach of a community order. He failed to attend on several later dates and surrendered on 13 February 2023. The alleged breach was subsequently not proved. On 14 February 2023 he admitted an offence under section 6(2) of the Bail Act 1976; an allegation under section 6(1) was not pursued. He received 14 days’ custody and appealed against conviction and sentence. The central issues were whether the Recorder could initiate and determine an admitted failure-to-surrender charge without appointing a prosecutor, and whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction appeal and the sentence appeal.

1. Where bail has been granted by a court, the court itself should initiate proceedings for failure to surrender. A prosecutor may invite the court to take proceedings, but the absence of a prosecutor did not create a procedural error in this case. The Criminal Practice Direction also indicated that disposal of a section 6(1) or section 6(2) offence should not, without good reason, be adjourned until the conclusion of the proceedings for which bail had been granted.
2. The Recorder was entitled to require the admitted offence under section 6(2) to be put to the appellant. The facts were known and undisputed, so there was no useful prosecutorial role before sentence. The appellant suffered no prejudice, and the Recorder’s role did not create an appearance of partiality. If guilt or reasonable cause had been contested, prosecutorial assistance would have been necessary because the judge could not investigate the matter without risking entering the arena.
3. The European authorities relied on by the appellant concerned circumstances in which guilt was contested and the judge effectively combined the roles of complainant, prosecutor and decision-maker. They therefore did not govern this admitted case.
4. The Recorder was entitled to treat the offending as Category 1B, with a guideline starting point of 21 days’ custody. He had taken account of the appellant’s eventual surrender, the fact that the underlying breach was not proved, and the prompt plea. The 14-day sentence was not manifestly excessive. The seriousness of an offence under section 6(1) or section 6(2) is for the sentencing judge to assess in the individual case; section 6(1) is not inherently more serious.

1. Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): On 21 February 2023, dismissed the appeals against conviction and sentence.
2. Crown Court at Chelmsford: On 14 February 2023, Recorder Conley accepted the appellant’s admission of the section 6(2) offence and sentenced him to 14 days’ custody. The section 6(1) allegation was not pursued.