David Dixon v R

In sentencing for wounding with intent, the harm category under the applicable guideline must reflect the injury actually caused. A risk that an injury might become life-threatening if contingent events occurred is relevant to culpability, but does not itself establish that a particularly grave or life-threatening injury was caused. Where injuries are grave but fall short of that threshold, the offence should be placed in category 2, with movement towards the category 1 boundary where justified by the seriousness of the injuries and their lasting consequences. The statutory conditions for a mandatory life sentence under the Sentencing Act 2020, section 283, were satisfied, and no particular circumstances made that sentence unjust.

The appellant was convicted at Wolverhampton Crown Court of wounding with intent, contrary to section 18 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, after being acquitted of attempted murder. He was sentenced to life imprisonment under section 283 of the Sentencing Act 2020, with a minimum term of 10 years less 331 days spent on remand. The sentencing judge treated the offence as culpability category A and harm category 1, producing a notional determinate sentence of 15 years.

On appeal against sentence, the appellant challenged the length of the notional determinate term, the imposition of a life sentence and the minimum term. The central issues were the proper classification of the injuries and the application of the mandatory life-sentence provisions in sections 283 and 285 of the 2020 Act.

1. Appeal dismissed. The court found no basis for altering the 15-year notional determinate sentence, the life sentence or the minimum term.
2. The injuries were undoubtedly grave, including a throat perforation, multiple stab wounds and a fractured eye socket, with lasting physical and psychological consequences. However, category 1 harm required a particularly grave or life-threatening injury to have been caused. The evidence showed only that the injury could have become life-threatening if treatment had been delayed and appropriate antibiotics had not been given. That contingency did not establish category 1 harm. The offence should therefore have been placed in category 2, whose starting point was seven years.
3. The risk of life-threatening injury remained a significant culpability feature. Together with the seriousness of the injuries and their lasting consequences, it justified moving the category 2 starting point to 11 years. The appellant’s serious antecedents, repeated offending on licence, commission of the offence shortly after release, use of drugs and alcohol, and attempt to persuade the victim to minimise his culpability justified the uplift to a 15-year notional determinate sentence.
4. The court considered the sentencing approach in AGs Ref No 27 of 2013 (Burkinskas) [2014] EWCA Crim 334. The sentencing judge had correctly identified that the conditions in section 283 of the Sentencing Act 2020 were met: the index offence and previous offence were qualifying offences, the appellant was over 21, and the determinate sentence would have exceeded 10 years. Section 283 required life imprisonment unless particular circumstances relating to the index offence, previous offence or offender made that unjust.
5. The judge had also referred to section 285, but had not explained why he would not have imposed a discretionary life sentence under that provision. The Court of Appeal did not need to resolve that issue because the mandatory life sentence under section 283 was properly imposed. The appellant’s offending history, repeated licence recalls, conduct in custody and approved premises, rapid return to substance misuse and high risk of serious harm supported the conclusion that imposing life imprisonment was not unjust.

• Wolverhampton Crown Court: the appellant was convicted of wounding with intent and sentenced to life imprisonment, with a minimum term of 10 years less 331 days spent on remand.
• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): the appeal against sentence was dismissed. The court upheld the life sentence, the 15-year notional determinate term and the minimum term.