R v Zakaria Chentouf

Sentence indications should be rare and precise. If another judge may impose sentence, the indication should make clear that it is not binding, although it may be taken into account. The sentencing court remains subject to section 59(1) of the Sentencing Code and must follow the relevant guideline unless the interests of justice require otherwise. A guilty plea on the first day of trial normally attracts 10 per cent credit. Exception F1 applies where particular circumstances substantially impair understanding of the allegation or make an earlier plea unreasonable. It does not apply where the defendant delays pleading guilty to assess the strength of the prosecution case.

The applicant pleaded guilty at trial to being concerned in the supply of heroin and cocaine after the prosecution served late evidence. The trial judge indicated that a substantially greater reduction would be given if the applicant changed his pleas. Sentencing later took place before a different judge, who treated the pleas as having been entered on the first day of trial and allowed 10 per cent credit, imposing 48 months’ imprisonment. A single judge refused leave to appeal. The renewed application concerned whether the earlier indication created an entitlement to greater credit and whether it had placed improper pressure on the applicant to plead guilty.

Leave to appeal refused. The sentence was neither manifestly excessive nor wrong in principle. The sentencing judge’s assessment of the applicant’s role, personal mitigation and previous convictions was unimpeachable.

1. Improper pressure resulting from a sentence indication may provide grounds for setting aside a conviction where it deprives a defendant of the free choice whether to plead guilty. That issue did not arise because the application was against sentence, and the indication in this case had not placed improper pressure on the applicant. The court referred to R v AB [2021] EWCA Crim 2003, reported at [2022] 2 Cr.App.R 10.
2. Sentence indications should be rare and expressed in precise terms. The judge giving an indication should consider whether sentencing is likely to be undertaken by another judge. If so, the indication should state clearly that it is non-binding, though capable of being taken into account, and should be accurately recorded on the Digital Case System.
3. Section 59(1) of the Sentencing Code required the sentencing judge to follow the relevant guilty-plea guideline unless satisfied that doing so would be contrary to the interests of justice. The guideline allowed 10 per cent credit for a plea on the first day of trial unless an exception applied. Exception F1 permits a one-third reduction where particular circumstances significantly reduce the defendant’s ability to understand the allegation or make it unreasonable to expect an earlier plea. It requires sentencers to distinguish the need for evidence or advice to understand guilt from delay intended to assess the strength of the prosecution case.
4. The late material had already been served in summary form. The applicant knew that he was guilty and had delayed his pleas to assess the prosecution evidence. Exception F1 therefore did not apply. The earlier indication was vague, the sentencing hearing had not been reserved to the first judge, and the later judge was not bound by it. No legitimate expectation of a particular discount arose, and the 10 per cent reduction was correct.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): The renewed application for leave to appeal against sentence was refused.
• Single judge: Leave to appeal was refused.
• Crown Court at Lewes: The applicant was sentenced to 48 months’ imprisonment after pleading guilty to two counts of being concerned in the supply of class A drugs.