R v Bijan Lajevarti

A juror’s personal experience of crime does not, without more, disqualify that juror or establish apparent bias. Jurors may discuss a trial as it proceeds only when all are together in the jury room and can keep open minds until the evidence, submissions and directions are complete.

Where a possible irregularity arises, the judge should follow the stepped procedure in Criminal Practice Direction 26M, including establishing its basic facts. It is preferable to question every juror directly involved. A failure to question one such juror does not make a conviction unsafe where the established facts provide no proper basis for apparent bias or further investigation.

Following a trial at the Crown Court at Newcastle upon Tyne, the applicant was convicted of indecent assault contrary to section 14 of the Sexual Offences Act 1956 and acquitted on a second count involving another complainant. Before verdicts were returned, Juror 1 disclosed that he had been sexually abused as a child and said that, after one complainant’s evidence, he had told Juror 2 that he knew how she felt because he had experienced the same situation.

The trial judge questioned Juror 1 but not Juror 2, concluded that Juror 1 could remain faithful to his oath, and declined to discharge the jury. The applicant sought leave to appeal and a direction that the Criminal Cases Review Commission investigate the jurors’ conduct. The central issues were whether the judge had adequately investigated the possible jury irregularity and whether the conviction was unsafe.

1. Application refused. Leave to appeal against conviction was refused. The proposed direction to the Criminal Cases Review Commission therefore fell away.
2. The judge correctly applied the stepped procedure in Criminal Practice Direction 26M and the apparent-bias test in Porter v Magill [2001] UKHL 67. A jury irregularity includes anything, including potential bias, that may prevent a juror from remaining faithful to the oath and returning a true verdict according to the evidence.
3. The judge was entitled to conclude that Juror 1 could perform that duty. A juror’s experience of being a victim of sexual abuse did not, by itself, disqualify him from jury service or establish actual or apparent bias. Jurors may use their life experience and discuss the trial as it proceeds, but discussion must take place when all jurors are together in the jury room and they must keep open minds until the trial material is complete. That principle was reflected in R v Edwards [2021] EWCA Crim 1870.
4. The exchange between Juror 1 and Juror 2 arguably included an implied comment on a complainant’s credibility outside the jury room and in the absence of the other jurors. The judge should preferably have questioned Juror 2 when establishing the basic facts. That omission was a collective oversight, but it did not render the conviction unsafe. Even at its highest, the material disclosed no proper basis for concluding that Juror 2 was biased or that the disclosure altered his independent assessment or influenced other jurors.
5. The contrasting verdicts did not support an inference of bias. They were consistent with a separate and dispassionate assessment of the two charges.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): the application for leave to appeal against conviction was refused; the application for a direction to the Criminal Cases Review Commission accordingly fell away.
• Crown Court at Newcastle upon Tyne: following trial before HH Judge Bindloss and a jury, the applicant was convicted of one count of indecent assault and acquitted on another count on 10 November 2022.