R v Mark Walker & Ors

Sentencing for conspiracy to pervert the course of justice requires consideration of the seriousness of the substantive offence, persistence and the effect of the attempt. Relevant factors include the underlying offence, deceptive conduct, duration, success or failure, character and personal mitigation. Such conduct strikes at the heart of the administration of justice and almost invariably requires immediate custody, although the sentence need not be lengthy to achieve deterrence. A sentence is not unduly lenient merely because another judge might have imposed a longer sentence. Where the sentencing judge applied the correct principles and considered the relevant factors, particular weight should be given to that judge’s fact-specific assessment.

The Attorney General referred the sentences of Damien Drackley, Lorraine Frisby, Mark Walker and Leslie Allen under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988. The respondents had been convicted, or had pleaded guilty, in connection with conspiracies to pervert the course of justice and offences under the Juries Act 1974.

The conspiracy concerned attempts to secure Leslie Allen’s acquittal in a serious drugs trial by arranging false evidence and attempting to influence a juror. Cavanagh J sentenced the offenders at the Central Criminal Court and, in Mr Walker’s case, at the Crown Court sitting at Isleworth. The Attorney General contended that all four sentences were unduly lenient. The central issue was whether the sentencing judge had imposed sentences that could reasonably be described as unduly lenient.

1. Reference dismissed. The court granted leave to bring the Attorney General’s Reference because the case justified review, but concluded that none of the sentences was unduly lenient.
2. There were no offence-specific sentencing guidelines. The relevant principles required consideration of the seriousness of the substantive offence, the persistence of the conduct and the effect of the attempt to pervert the course of justice. Relevant factors included the seriousness of the underlying offence, the nature of the deceptive conduct, the period over which it continued, whether the attempt succeeded, and the offender’s character and personal mitigation.
3. Conduct intended to pervert the course of justice strikes at the heart of the administration of justice and almost invariably calls for immediate custody. Immediate imprisonment need not, however, be lengthy to achieve deterrence. Imprisonment is itself a substantial deterrent.
4. The authorities, including R v Tunney [2006] EWCA Crim 2066, [2007] 1 Cr.App.R (S) 91 and R v Abdulwahab [2018] EWCA Crim 1399, [2018] 2 Cr.App.R (S) 46, provided limited assistance because sentencing remained fact-specific.
5. The sentencing judge had directed himself correctly, considered the relevant factors and was best placed to assess the criminality after hearing the trial. Some judges might have imposed slightly longer sentences, but that did not make these sentences unduly lenient. The individual mitigation available to Ms Frisby and Mr Walker was also relevant to the conclusion.

1. Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) — The Attorney General obtained leave to refer the sentences under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988. The Reference was dismissed.
2. Central Criminal Court and Crown Court sitting at Isleworth — Cavanagh J sentenced the respondents on 27 January 2023 and Mr Walker on 3 February 2023 for the relevant conspiracy and jury-related offences.