R v Joanne Yeates

When a statutory minimum sentence applies, the sentencing court should first identify the sentence indicated by the relevant Sentencing Council guideline, then assess whether the statutory minimum is markedly more severe. That comparison forms part of the context for deciding whether imposing the minimum would be unjust. The time since the last qualifying offence is relevant, although lapse of time alone does not establish injustice. Other relevant circumstances may include isolated offending and evidence of rehabilitation. The statutory deterrent purpose remains important, and the exception is intended to be relatively rare.

The appellant pleaded guilty to two offences of being concerned in supplying Class A drugs. She had two previous qualifying drug-trafficking convictions, making the statutory minimum applicable under section 313 of the Sentencing Act 2020. The sentencing judge imposed seven years on each count, reduced to 2,045 days for the guilty plea, after finding no particular circumstances making the minimum unjust.

The appellant appealed, arguing that insufficient weight had been given to the age of the previous convictions, her personal circumstances, and the limited role and circumstances of the current offending. The central issue was whether the statutory minimum would be unjust in all the circumstances.

1. Appeal allowed. The Court of Appeal quashed the sentences of 2,045 days’ imprisonment and substituted concurrent sentences of three years’ imprisonment on each count. The other orders made below were unaffected.

2. The statutory minimum provisions must be applied with regard to their deterrent purpose. Sentencing courts should not circumvent Parliament’s intention through an unduly liberal interpretation of the exception for particular circumstances. Decisions in this area are highly fact-sensitive, and previous decisions on different facts do not operate as fixed authorities.

3. Applying the principles drawn together in Woofe [2019] EWCA (Crim.) 2249, the sentencing court should first apply the relevant sentencing guideline. It should then determine whether the resulting sentence complies with the statutory minimum. If the guideline sentence is materially lower, the comparison is relevant to whether the statutory minimum would be unjust. A sentence that is markedly more severe than the sentence otherwise indicated is an important circumstance.

4. The sentencing judge had not carried out that exercise. The Court of Appeal assessed the guideline sentence itself. The appellant’s lesser role led to a starting point of three years. Her previous convictions were significantly aggravating, but the available mitigation and the guilty plea produced an appropriate sentence of about three years.

5. The passage of time since the last qualifying offence cannot, by itself, make the statutory minimum unjust, but it is relevant. An offence-free period of more than ten years was at or beyond the upper end of the range seen in the authorities. The isolated nature of the current supply offending and the appellant’s ability to maintain employment were also significant evidence of rehabilitation. Taken together with the marked disparity between the guideline sentence and the statutory minimum, those circumstances made this one of the relatively rare cases in which imposing the minimum was unjust.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): The appeal against sentence was allowed. The sentence imposed below was quashed and concurrent three-year sentences were substituted.
• Crown Court: HHJ Thompson imposed concurrent sentences of seven years on the two counts, reduced for the guilty plea to 2,045 days.