R v Campbell McKeegans

In sentencing for making a threat to kill, the judge may depart from a categorisation proposed or agreed by the parties, provided the categorisation reached is justified by the evidence. A weapon may support higher culpability, while very significant distress may place the harm in the highest guideline category. The Sentencing Council’s guidance for young offenders provides a rough guide rather than a mechanical formula. The appropriate reduction depends on the offender’s age and circumstances. The totality principle has limited direct relevance where sentence is imposed for a single offence, although the offender’s overall circumstances may still be considered. An appeal will not succeed merely because the judge did not expressly address delay if the sentence is neither wrong in principle nor manifestly excessive.

The appellant pleaded guilty to one count of making a threat to kill and was sentenced by HHJ Lucking on 27 February 2023 to 26 months’ detention in a young offender institution. He was 10 days short of his 18th birthday when the offence was committed and was 19 when sentenced.

He appealed against sentence on grounds concerning the guideline entry point, the categorisation of culpability and harm, the effect of his vulnerabilities and alleged drugging, totality, youth and delay in sentencing. The central issues were whether the offence was properly categorised as A1, whether the sentence sufficiently reflected the appellant’s youth and mitigation, and whether the resulting sentence was excessive.

1. Appeal dismissed. The sentencing judge was correct to categorise the offending as A1 under the threat-to-kill guideline.
2. The judge was entitled to consider the complete video, including its audio content. It demonstrated that the complainant was subjected to very significant distress and believed that failure to remove the drugs would result in serious violence or death. The visible machete justified higher culpability. The harm was properly placed in category 1, even without the additional humiliation caused by the conduct.
3. A sentencing judge may reach a categorisation outside that proposed by the prosecution, or agreed by both parties, where the categorisation is justified. The mere fact of departure from the parties’ position is irrelevant and is not itself a ground of appeal.
4. The judge took account of the accepted basis of plea, the appellant’s troubled childhood, his vulnerabilities and his previous convictions. Although she misstated the youth guidance as referring to a reduction “by” half to two-thirds, she otherwise treated the guidance correctly. For offenders aged 15 to 17, the reduction to half to two-thirds of the adult sentence is a rough guide and must not be applied mechanically. A reduction of about 20 per cent was justified here because the appellant was only 10 days short of 18. The judge also refrained from increasing the four-year starting point for previous convictions in light of the mitigation. After the youth reduction and full guilty-plea credit, the sentence was 26 months.
5. Totality was not directly engaged by sentence for a single offence. Nevertheless, the appellant’s circumstances, including that he was already detained, had been taken into account. The absence of an express reference to delay did not render the sentence wrong in principle or manifestly excessive.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): dismissed the appeal against sentence.
• Sentencing decision: On 27 February 2023, HHJ Lucking sentenced the appellant to 26 months’ detention in a young offender institution following his guilty plea.