Peter Robert Storey, R (on the application of) v Crown Court at Leeds

Permission for judicial review requires an arguable claim with a realistic prospect of success. Judicial review remains supervisory. It is not a forum for disagreement with factual findings, reargument of the merits, or new merits arguments not advanced below.

Where a Crown Court has heard oral evidence and conducted cross-examination, its factual evaluations fall within a broad area of judgment. They will not ordinarily provide a public-law basis for intervention. In challenges concerning election of summary trial, the central question is whether the accused understood the nature and significance of the choice between summary trial and trial on indictment. The statutory explanation duty is important, but compliance may be presumed unless the contrary is shown.

The claimant had been convicted in the Magistrates’ Court of stalking, an either-way offence, after electing summary trial. During his Crown Court appeal, he applied to vacate that election and obtain a fresh jury trial. The Crown Court rejected the application after hearing evidence from the claimant, his former solicitor and family members, finding that the claimant had understood his options and had knowingly elected summary trial.

The claimant sought judicial review of that ruling, alleging errors of fact, law, procedure and fairness. Permission had been refused on the papers. The issue before the Administrative Court was whether the renewed claim was arguable with a realistic prospect of success.

1. Permission threshold. The court refused permission. The claimant had to show an arguable public-law challenge with a realistic prospect of success. Judicial review performs a secondary supervisory function. It does not permit the court to revisit the merits, reargue factual issues, or advance new merits arguments.
2. Factual findings. The Crown Court had heard extensive oral evidence and cross-examination. Its acceptance of the solicitor’s evidence, and rejection of the claimant’s evidence on the central question whether advice had been given about the choice of venue, was within its permissible factual latitude. Those conclusions were unassailable on judicial review.
3. Mode of trial. The relevant question, identified in Hodgson, was whether the claimant had made an election while properly understanding the nature and significance of the choice. The Crown Court had jurisdiction to determine that issue. The court’s conclusion that the claimant had understood the choice and had elected summary trial was adequately supported by the evidence.
4. Statutory explanation. The ordinary-language explanation required by section 20(2) of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 did not require the word jury to be used, provided the substance of the choice was conveyed. The assumption described in Gould operated unless the contrary was shown. The Crown Court had given that statutory duty significant weight while considering the evidence as a whole. A formal record of consent was not a precondition to answering the Hodgson question.
5. The various complaints about evidential omissions, witness names, hearing management, the order of evidence, closing submissions, deliberation time and alleged predisposition did not disclose a viable public-law error. The court refused permission for judicial review. There was no order as to costs, and no reimbursement was ordered for the transcript fee.

• Crown Court at Leeds: On 21 January 2022, rejected the claimant’s application to vacate his election of summary trial after hearing oral evidence, and made adverse credibility findings.
• High Court (Administrative Court): Refused permission for judicial review of that ruling.