RUPERT ST JOHN WEBSTER v JOHN FRANCIS PENLEY & Anor.

An extended civil restraint order may be extended where the court considers that extension appropriate. The threshold conditions for making an order under Practice Direction 3C, paragraph 3.1, are not automatically imported into the separate extension power in paragraph 3.10.

The governing question is whether extension is necessary to protect litigants from vexatious proceedings, to protect court resources from vexatious waste, or both. The court must balance that necessity against the restrained party’s access to the courts. An order may remain proportionate where it permits applications for permission and does not impose an absolute bar.

The applicants sought a further extension of an extended civil restraint order made against the claimant on 10 February 2021. The order required him to obtain permission before issuing proceedings or making applications concerning disputes connected with The Priory, Ash Priors, or related persons.

The application followed several further totally without merit certifications, continued correspondence alleging wrongdoing, and draft orders seeking to reopen long-running disputes. The central issue was whether the test for making an extended civil restraint order also governed an application for extension under Practice Direction 3C, paragraph 3.10, and whether a further extension was necessary and proportionate.

1. Extension granted. The order of Morgan J dated 10 February 2021 was extended for a further two years. The claimant was ordered to pay the application costs, assessed at £14,000 on the standard basis.
2. Under CPR 3.11 and Practice Direction 3C, paragraph 3.10, the question on an extension application is whether the court considers it appropriate to extend the order. The threshold in paragraph 3.1, including persistent issue of claims or applications which are totally without merit, is a condition for imposing an order and is not to be read into paragraph 3.10.
3. The same underlying necessity informs both stages. The court must determine whether the order or its extension is necessary to protect litigants from vexatious proceedings and/or to protect the finite resources of the court from vexatious waste. The effect of restricting access to the courts must be fully considered.
4. There were, in any event, three further totally without merit certifications after the original order. The claimant’s obsessive approach, refusal to accept adverse orders, continuing allegations against the applicants and their solicitors, and draft orders seeking to undo extensive earlier litigation created a real and serious risk of further unmeritorious and vexatious proceedings.
5. The restraint remained proportionate because it was not an absolute bar. The claimant could apply for permission, which would be granted for properly arguable proceedings that were not totally without merit. The duration also had to be assessed separately. A further period of two years, rather than the maximum period sought, was appropriate so that future conduct could be reviewed.

First-instance decision. The judgment records earlier refusals of permission to appeal and applications concerning certificates under section 12 of the Administration of Justice Act 1969, but this application was determined in the High Court.