Social Work England v Mohamed Sannoh

The court may extend an interim conditions of practice order where continuation is necessary for public protection or public confidence. The court assesses risk rather than determining the merits of the underlying allegations, unless the case is plainly without merit. Relevant considerations include the seriousness of the allegations, the evidence, the risk of harm, the reasons for delay and prejudice to the practitioner. An interim conditions order is less intrusive than interim suspension and may be proportionate where supervision and reporting remain workable. The court may permit a party overseas to observe proceedings or make submissions remotely, distinguishing that from the taking of evidence, which engages special rules. A proportionate extension may provide reasonable headroom for the substantive fitness-to-practise hearing.

Social Work England sought a nine-month extension of an interim conditions of practice order imposed on the defendant in May 2021 and previously extended by the High Court. The substantive fitness-to-practise hearing had begun but was adjourned for good reason and was not expected to resume before August 2023. The defendant was in Sierra Leone, had been served with the claim and did not participate in the hearing.

The court considered whether the order remained necessary, whether it was fair to proceed in the defendant’s absence, whether the defendant could have participated remotely from overseas, and whether the requested duration was necessary and proportionate.

1. Extension granted. The court extended the interim conditions of practice order for nine months, to 8 February 2024, with no order as to costs.
2. Under paragraph 14 of Schedule 2 to the Social Workers Regulations 2018, the court applied the necessity test identified in GMC v Hiew [2007] EWCA Civ 369. The order could continue where necessary for protection of the public or public confidence. The court considered the gravity of the allegations, the nature of the evidence, the seriousness of the risk, the reasons for delay and prejudice to the practitioner.
3. The court was assessing risk, not making findings of primary fact or deciding the merits of the allegations, except where it could clearly see that the case had little merit. The allegations were serious, concerned alleged dishonesty and safeguarding failures, were supported by evidence from several sources and were sufficient to establish a prima facie case.
4. The order was prejudicial but was less intrusive than an interim suspension order. Its supervision and reporting conditions were workable and proportionate, and the public interest in continuation decisively outweighed the defendant’s prejudice.
5. It was appropriate to proceed in the defendant’s absence. He had been served, could have appeared remotely or filed written material, and there was no unfairness in proceeding.
6. The court accepted the distinction between taking evidence from abroad and observing proceedings or making oral submissions remotely. The latter fell within the court’s case-management powers and could have been permitted in the interests of justice, subject to distinguishing submissions from evidence and addressing recording and related safeguards.
7. The nine-month period was necessary and proportionate because the resumed hearing might not be listed until November 2023 or later. A shorter period risked a further unnecessary application.