EBK v DLO

Disclosure of information from ongoing section 8 proceedings to the police is governed by Children Act 1989 section 12 and the exempting provisions in the Family Procedure Rules. A party may disclose information to a specialist police officer acting in furtherance of child protection. To a non-specialist officer investigating crime, disclosure is generally confined to a judgment or order, subject to the statutory and rules-based exceptions.

An application for permission to bring contempt proceedings requires a strong prima facie case, a public-interest justification, proportionality and compliance with the overriding objective. The court may refuse permission where the breach is technical, protection was being sought, substantial alternative redress exists, the applicant engaged in similar conduct, and proceedings would be disproportionate.

The claimant sought permission to pursue contempt proceedings against the defendant, his former partner, for disclosing documents from concluded child arrangements proceedings to West Yorkshire Police while seeking protection from alleged harassment. The alleged disclosures included a Cafcass report, a domestic-abuse programme assessment and a position statement.

The claimant also sought anonymity for the parties and child. The court considered the scope of section 12, the interaction with section 97(2), the permitted police disclosures under the Family Procedure Rules, the permission test under FPR Part 37, and whether a defendant in potential contempt proceedings could remain anonymous.

1. Disclosure to the police. Section 12 protects non-exempt information relating to private section 8 proceedings. The actus reus is disclosure of such information beyond the permitted matters. The mens rea is knowledge, or indifference, as to the fact that the material relates to the proceedings; knowledge that the disclosure might interfere with the administration of justice is unnecessary.
2. Under the Family Procedure Rules, a party may disclose any information relating to the proceedings to a specialist police officer acting in furtherance of child protection. To a non-specialist police officer for a criminal investigation, the permitted disclosure is the text or summary of a judgment, or an order. Disclosure of other documents, such as a Cafcass report, remains prohibited unless the officers are specialists.
3. Section 97(2). The court expressed the obiter view that disclosure to police officers acting in their official capacity is not publication to the public or a section of the public. It proceeded on that footing, while recognising that a definitive decision would require an actual prosecution.
4. Permission. Because the relevant family proceedings had concluded, permission under FPR 37.3 was required. The applicant had to establish a strong prima facie case; that the public interest required proceedings, having regard to the secrecy interest, circumstances, significance, motive, use, impact, comparable conduct by the applicant, alternative redress and section 97(2); that proceedings were proportionate; and that they complied with the overriding objective.
5. The defendant’s breach was admitted and the case against her was strong. Nevertheless, permission was refused. The disclosure was technical and arbitrary, occurred while the defendant was seeking police protection, the claimant had substantial alternative redress in defamation proceedings, he had himself breached section 12, public resources would be consumed, and the asymmetry caused by anonymising the claimant while naming a guilty defendant would be unfair. The defendant was admonished for the breach.
6. For proceedings under FPR Part 37, the 2015 committal Practice Direction continues to require a guilty defendant to be named publicly after a finding of contempt. Before such a finding, anonymity may be ordered where necessary to secure the proper administration of justice or protect the interests of a party or child. The parties and child were therefore anonymised in this permission application.

First-instance decision of the High Court (Family Division). The judgment records earlier family-court proceedings and related High Court defamation proceedings, but this application was determined as a fresh permission application.